186, 728, 648, 668

Syria	MD1
Israel	MF1
Jordan	MG1
●Iraq	MH1
Lebanon	ME1

/For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Succession States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see 66: Bonné, M1 Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87./

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self-interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the important town families—and notably those of religious pretension—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Hamidiyan régime political life could not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

but fatalistic acceptance, which was mixed in Shi'i quarters with theocratic as well as emotional repugnance, and in Sunni often with genuine if paradoxical respect for the Caliph. To none at this time was an alternative conceivable. At the best, reform of some present abuses could be hoped, and the persistence of Arab race-consciousness and the slow growth of a critical spirit were already bringing such hopes to birth. But there was heard in 'Iraq no echo yet of the literary and political movements in the Lebanon and Egypt, where even now an Arab Movement was coming to birth.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

000 grotesquely incompetent brother and the control of Government by the Young Turks almost continuously from 1909 to 1914 by their influence over elections, their instructions to high officials everywhere through party agents and political clubs, and their courts martial which practically suspended the normal course of justice and administration during these years. The high hopes with which Western nations, especially Great Britain, had greeted the new order in 1908 were doomed to disappointment. It is true that repeated crises did much to deprive the C.U.P. of a fair chance and, equally, that the desperate needs of Turkey seemed to call emphatically for a militarily efficient régime: considerations which largely explain the Young Turks' failure to fulfil the expectations evoked, in every subject race, by their early protestations. But there was a deeper reason; the conception of devolution, decentralization, was foreign to even the most enlightened Turkish thought of the time; the 'freedom' offered was freedom as Ottomans, equality as Ottomans. The call to a single Ottoman loyalty, greater centralization, and firmer discipline was the Young Turks' formula for regenerating their country; Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks had hoped for the very opposite. The policy of the governing clique as it developed represented the victory of the more ruthless element in the C.U.P. which sought only in standardization and efficiency the means to rescue the Empire, and which was soon to restore Germany to a privileged, almost to a monopolist, position in Turkish counsels.

722 648 In the 'Iraq wilayas, news of the foreign struggles and defeats of the Turkish Empire excited slight interest even in the towns and among the half-Turkish effendis. The Italian war induced the opening of subscriptions in Baghdad for warlike or war-charitable purposes, with derisory results; some gestures of patriotism were attempted, unreal offers of personal service made, prayers for victory offered; but the ignorance and almost total apathy of the 'Iraq peoples (except the Government hierarchy), their indifference to the grotesquely false communiqués of the Agence Ottomane, their satisfaction rather than dismay at the embarrassments of their masters, made a practical loyalty inconceivable. Some troops were drafted to Europe, recruiting was intensified, full mobilization proclaimed, taxation increased by cesses, officials' salaries diminished by a war levy, and subscriptions invited for warships, aircraft, the Army, the wounded. An internal loan was floated, but evoked a minimum of response.

668 The political revolution in the capital was not, however, without practical results in 'Iraq. Some high officials were at once removed, some political exiles could now return to Istanbul. The telegram of July 1908, announcing immediate elections, created intense

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

excitement among possible deputies, and convulsed the diwans of the three provincial capitals. The visits of C.U.P. committee men from Istanbul to the 'Iraq cities were received with an initial enthusiasm which was soon stifled by the inept bad manners of the visitors and the frowns of the reactionary element already mobilizing its forces. Deputies duly elected[1] left Istanbul, and a public holiday marked the assembly of Parliament in December 1908, followed four months later by another for the accession of Muhammad V.

With the departure of leading 'Iraqis to Istanbul to try their hand at politics and to influence 'Iraq affairs, if they could, through the higher appointments, a new element entered 'Iraq life. At Istanbul the 'Iraqi deputies with the Syrian formed, from the first, a compact group in the Chamber as well as participating in a literary club—al-Muntadā al-Adabi—more political than cultural; and, returning to 'Iraq for recess, they spread ideas long strange to the territory. Some leading families, indeed, scornfully opposed these vulgar dangerous innovations and regretted their paternal Sultan; tribal shaykhs, disappointed of their naïve first hopes that 'freedom' would mean non-government, clamoured for separate seats in Parliament. The minorities first hoped for equality and progress, then learned that conscription and full Ottomanization were all their gains. All alike could threaten senior officials with 'political' reprisals, take a hand at electioneering, form political clubs, and flirt with the Liberal Party which after 1911 challenged the C.U.P. But on the whole the latter, in the 'Iraq of 1908 to 1914, dominated political circles, survived periods of secession and reaction, and alone maintained a country-wide organization. And when, as in Baṣra, it was strongly opposed, such opposition arose less from the Liberals than from the greater seduction of other ideas which were now coming into full expression in 'Iraq: those of Arab nationalism.

The emergence of such a nationalist movement was as inevitable as that of reform in Turkey itself. The sense of anachronism and frustration was common to the protagonists of both; and the Arab character, proud and individualistic, is incapable of admitting permanent inferiority. The emancipation of the subject races in Europe was increasingly known to them. The Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph destroyed almost the only bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government. The attainment of high office by 'Iraqis in southern 'Iraq, rumours of political life in

[1] The first Members for Baghdad in the Turkish Chamber were: Muḥammad Beg (an Istanbuli): Tawfiq Beg al-Khalidi (p. 140): Murad Beg: Fu'ad Beg al-Daftari, and Jamil al-Zahawi the poet (both members of leading Baghdad families): and the Jew Sasun Ḥasqayl (p. 127).

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Egypt, hints of a claim to nationhood itself put forward by Arab *émigrés* in Paris—all these, with developing intercommunication and greater awareness of world thought, had prepared the ground for nationalism in 'Iraq even before the final impetus of the Turkish revolution.

The 1908 revolution, while it created an active Turkish-political life in 'Iraq, soon indicated also the gulf between Turkish and Arab aspirations. An 'Arab Brotherhood' group, formed in the first Turkish Chamber, was summarily suppressed by the Young Turks; the proportion of Arab to Turkish deputies and senators in Parliament was unjustly low. Incoming Walis of the 'Iraq wilayas showed less sympathy than ever with decentralization or the suggested use of Arabic; more 'Iraqis than ever groaned at the hateful prospect of conscription in Turkish armies—perhaps to fight brother Arabs in the endless warfare of the Yaman. It followed that the politicians of 'Iraq soon after 1908 began to mix various strains of Arab separatism with their pro- or anti-C.U.P. polemics: and to treat seriously tentative ideas of greater local privilege, a higher proportion of appointments, wider local powers and, finally, local autonomy itself.

For such claims there was basis in Arab character and culture, in 'Iraq's geographical separateness, and perhaps still more in the personal aspirations of ambitious 'Iraqis, who could imagine a great career in an Arab or 'Iraqi State more easily than in a Turkish. Meanwhile there were the beginnings of contact with coteries formed abroad to foster Arab ambitions and to frame demands. Such were the secret but short-lived Qahtaniya in Istanbul, whose members favoured an Arab Kingdom within the Turkish Empire, and such the Young Arab Society which, moved from Paris to Beirut in 1913, was to play a heroic part in 1915. More important in 'Iraq were the local circles in contact with the Ottoman Decentralization Party of Cairo: a society which, founded in 1912 with its conception of local autonomy within the Empire, came nearest to expressing the political ambitions of the 'Iraqis of the day, and took root in Baghdad and Basra. The relations of Arab officers in Turkish regiments with their brother officers became strained, and 'Iraqi Qa'immaqams found odious the task of applying Turkish repressive measures. From 1910 to 1914 a surprising development of the press in 'Iraq marked the new political age. In place of the half-dozen colourless official newspapers of the wilaya capitals and Najf in Hamidiyan times, sheets of every colouring appeared in Arabic or Turkish month by month, to a final total of some fifty; they advocated various programmes—brilliant or foolish and always irresponsible—of pan-Islam, local or pan-Arab nationalism, Turkish patriotism or anti-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

foreign suspicion. A number of 'Iraqi officers and young 'notables', who were later to attain high positions under the 'Iraq Government, were active in these politics before 1914.

Of the three wilaya capitals Mosul showed at first the least enthusiasm for the Arab Movement, dominated as it was by families of the old régime, reactionary 'Ulamā, and a deep hinterland of Kurds. Baghdad political society was split into half a dozen factions—the pro-Turk (C.U.P., Liberal, or Ḥamidiyan), the Decentralizing, those in close touch with Syria, those with Egypt, those with Baṣra, and from somewhere among all these a secret Arab Patriotic Party was formed in 1912 with a vague programme of autonomy. In the Holy Cities the Mujtahid leadership, professedly eschewing all worldly politics, was little interested in an Arab nationalism which could offer it nothing, though driven at times to favour it by detestation of all things Turkish. The priesthood adopted in general a line of anti-Christian xenophobia, with a measure of positive pan-Islamism, while the Shi'i tribes hoped only for the joys of non-government.

Baṣra, farthest from Turkish interests and nearest to independent Arabia, took an unquestioned lead in the Arab Movement. It was inspired or terrorized by Sayid Ṭalib, a younger son of the venerated local Naqib family. An able, charming, unscrupulous and ambitious statesman, gang-leader, and patriot, he had been Mutaṣarrif of al-Aḥsā, had close contacts in Najd, Kuwayt, and Muḥammara and dominated Baṣra. He was at the opening of the century already well known in Istanbul as a man of the highest promise or danger, prepared to adopt whatever allegiances would favour his rise to an independent Amirate of southern 'Iraq. He reversed, after a year, his first adherence to the C.U.P., became its bitterest enemy, and sought to be at once the leading agent of Istanbul in his wilaya, and the first of Arab patriots. In 1912 he made overtures to the British in Egypt and in Simla, in 1913 was active in collecting war funds for the Turkish armies and declaring his support of the Empire. A month later he formed a Committee of National Defence, and communicated to the Wali and the Sadr-i-A'ẓham—Grand Wazir—a memorial pressing for the immediate summoning of a General Council of the wilaya 'to elaborate a scheme of reforms'.

In March 1913 spokesmen in Baghdad were organizing a 'united demand' for decentralization on the model just published amid applause by a strong Beirut Committee, and were watching anti-Turk placards exposed by night in the Baghdad streets. Sayid Ṭalib meanwhile convened at Muḥammara a meeting of himself, Shaykh Khaz'al of Muḥammara, Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwayt, and high officials of Baṣra wilaya, to formulate self-government proposals.

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In May some results appeared, induced perhaps more by the Beirut than the Baṣra pressure. A new Wilaya Law ordained the increased use of Arabic in Arab wilayas, and the formation of a not ineffective General Council in each. Sayid Ṭalib telegraphed vainly to Istanbul in protest against so hollow a concession and informed Mr. Crow, the British Consul, that a trial of strength was now inevitable. The Consul thought it prudent to summon a British warship, H.M.S. *Alert*, which anchored for a time off 'Ashar; but Sayid Ṭalib decided after all on a policy of moderate pressure, until the resounding murder of the local general, Farid Bey—a crime inevitably ascribed to Sayid Ṭalib—diverted attention from less vivid politics. In the same month, June 1913, the Wali of Baghdad arrested four leading nationalist spokesmen, including Yusif al-Suwaydi, for the excessive freedom of their anti-Turkish expressions; but all save one were promptly released. In July and August hopeful-seeming Turko-Arab negotiations took place in Istanbul after the Arabs had organized a meeting in June in Paris which, attended by two 'Iraqis, pressed for decentralization; and in August a decree promulgated in all wilayas seemed to grant a substantial part of Arab demands. Military service was to be performed only within the Inspectorate; the schools would teach in Arabic, with higher education in Turkish; officials in Arab territory would be Arab-speaking, and all but the highest appointments would be made locally; progressive foreign experts would be employed, grants of funds could be expected, the resolutions of the General Wilaya Councils would be executed, three ministers of the Central Government, five Walis, ten Mutaṣarrifs were to be Arabs. But these provisions, felt with excellent reason to be a mere placation of Arab demands, evoked more of 'Iraqi scepticism than confidence.

The gulf between Arab and Turkish views was by now profound and explicit. Most foreigners, not unsympathetic to Arab demands, still felt their nationalism to be a premature and unreliable candidate for support; they distrusted Arab administrative powers even as compared with Turkish, and noted the mutually hostile groups into which the Arab nationalist world was already divided, and in which no one spoke for 'Iraq, since such a unit was not yet imagined. But, on whatever level, agitation in every form continued, and interchanges with the movements in the Levant increased. A secret society, al-'Ahd—the Covenant—was from early in 1914 to embrace scores of 'Iraqi officers in the Turkish Army. The Baṣra 'Reform Committee' with Sayid Ṭalib as President, published an inflammatory pamphlet. Telegrams still poured from 'Iraq to Istanbul, demanding Arab autonomy. Writers in the newspapers abandoned restraint, nationalist clubs were formed

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

openly. A conference was planned for Kuwayt in January 1914, to be attended by representatives of the Sharif of Mecca, ibn Sa'ud, ibn Rashid, Sayid Ṭalib himself, and 'Ujaymi Pasha of the Muntafiq; but Turkish opposition, and the hesitations of these potentates, contrived to prevent the meeting. In March Sayid Ṭalib announced, surprisingly, that his differences with the Government were now composed; he received a high Turkish decoration and a choice of posts as Ambassador, Senator, or Wali.

Nationalist politics were, in the summer of 1914, eclipsed by the excitement of elections to the Turkish Chamber. Elections for the Wilaya General Councils followed. The assembly of these bodies produced little of interest, though open conflict between their ostensible powers and the reality of centralized Turkish control could not be far distant. The telegram of July 1914, announcing the assassination of the Archduke at Sarajevo, reached an 'Iraq whose political problems were all unsolved.

The 'Iraqis prominent in the politics of this period included a number for whom, or for whose families, a distinguished future was reserved. Such were the 'Umari, Jalili, and Khayyaṭ families of Mosul, the Naqibs, Basha'yans, and Mandils of Baṣra, and in Baghdad the Chadirchis (Rif'at Bey and his son Ra'uf), the Suwaydis (Yusif Effendi and three sons), the Kurdish Babans (Isma'il Ḥaqqi Bey and Ḥamdi Bey), the Pachachis, the Daftaris, the Rawis, the Ḥaydaris, the Alusis, the Jamilzada, the Khudhayris, the house of Shawkat Pasha, and a dozen more. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylani, took no part in politics save for an attitude of conservatism and deep respect for the Caliph; his sons were reputed to be moderate nationalists.

2. ADMINISTRATION: THE LAST PHASE

The last years of the Turkish administration, apart from some well-intentioned striving for improvement after 1909, showed few new elements. It contrasted, indeed, favourably with the struggles, corruptions, and near-anarchy of neighbouring Persia; and it did not lack its European apologists. Mr. Crow, Consul at Baṣra, was heard to call the Turks '. . . genial and agreeable exponents of paternal despotism and *dolce far niente*', and David Fraser in 1908 recorded that 'the Moslem peoples of Asiatic Turkey have no deep-rooted desire for reform . . .: Turkey, from an oriental point of view, has never been a badly governed country.' These were not isolated opinions; many domiciled foreigners were tolerant of the absurd red tape, the easy venality, the delays and impotencies of the effendis.

The level of administration was not greatly heightened by the efforts of the post-revolutionary central Government. A Committee

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

182 Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the
668 Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in
563 the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unim-
369 portant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Hilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

579 Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained,
674 and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most dis-
[731] turbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913) the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

staff, insisted nevertheless on standards of education and knowledge of English necessarily lacking in the hundreds of unemployed 'Iraqi ex-officials. These, idle and aggrieved, crowded the coffee shops; and the return of many more from Turkey increased the body of malcontents. Wilson's Administration in fact made little effective effort to use in senior or even junior posts the considerable experience and goodwill possessed by the available 'Iraqis.

Such are among the considerations which can explain the willingness of large elements of the fickle and disillusioned 'Iraqi public, by the end of 1919, to support any anti-British movement which might appear. The leadership which such movement was in fact to follow was that of nationalism: that Arab nationalism which the Wilson Administration, and notably its head, largely through too local and too limited an experience of Arabs and ignorance of the political conceptions now new-born or coming to birth in Europe, belittled and distrusted. The development of this movement, and the successive uneasy stages by which 'Iraq was to advance to a new constitutional status, are next to be recorded.

3. OPPOSITION TO THE BRITISH

The Hijaz correspondence of 1915–16 between the Sharif Husayn and Sir Henry McMahon had accepted the idea of a post-war Arab State to embrace, with named exceptions, all Arab territories in Asia. It could indeed be argued that 'Iraq stood apart from other Arab lands, with differing needs and conditions; it could be shown that the McMahon letters called for 'special administrative arrangements in Basra and Baghdad'. But such exclusion from the Arab State could, the Sharif had replied, be only temporary 'for a period to be settled by negotiation': 'Iraq was a historic and sacred Arab land. A British policy of mere selfish acquisition of 'Iraq was after this, to any serious statesman, unthinkable; and in fact War Office instructions of March 1917 had already visualized specifically an Arab Amirate of Basra and Baghdad. The formation of an Arab State or States was an objective of idealists and realists alike, in Syria and in London; it was visibly realized under the Amir Faysal in Damascus before the end of 1918; and a policy of self-determination for the ex-Ottoman Arab countries had by that time been clearly expressed by the British Prime Minister in January 1918, again by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, yet again in the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November 1918. The last quoted declared 'the goal envisaged by France and Great Britain' to be 'the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of National Governments and administrations

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that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.'

The 'Iraq public, among whom this hopeful declaration raised high and immediate hopes, had throughout the War shown no visible signs of nationalist feeling. The political leaders of the period 1911–14 were scattered, Sayid Ṭalib abroad, the Clubs dead or inactive, the press non-existent, communications with other countries severed. But the movement was not dead; the end of the War, it might have been anticipated, must inevitably revive it with greater vitality than ever. Meanwhile no British act or speech in 'Iraq, save only the vague flamboyance of the Maude speech of March 1917, had given any indication of future self-government. Surprisingly, no use had been made in 'Iraq of Arab forces against the Turks, in spite of the success of these in the Ḥijaz and Syria, and the tentative prompting of the War Office itself. The British Military Command was deterred, it seemed, by the impossibility of guaranteeing the finality of Turkish disappearance, by the difficulty of equipping and training Arab recruits for serious warfare, by its lack of contact with the best 'Iraqi material such as the officers then fighting with the Amir Faysal: and perhaps not least by the attitude of the Government of India, which frankly disapproved of Arab national ambitions and of any movement which would encourage them.

The provisions of the administratively absurd and morally lamentable Sykes–Picot Agreement, signed by France and Great Britain in May 1916 and revealed to the world by the Russians in October 1917, seemed indeed if taken literally to weigh heavily against a self-determined régime for 'Iraq. It had provided that Mosul and part of its wilaya should be reserved for French exploitation, under Arab suzerainty, and that most of western 'Iraq should be of similar status but under British domination, with the body of central and southern districts placed under direct British rule. These provisions, which the French did not lightly abandon, were patently incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Sharifian commitments; and indeed the need to conciliate French feeling, especially in Syria, was a main and inescapable British post-war embarrassment.

Meanwhile the Anglo-French Declaration, the relaxing of many war-time restrictions, the return of 'Iraqis from abroad, the prospect of security and development in the territory, all raised its future as an immediate issue, and brought 'Iraqi nationalism back to life in a day.

Nourished from various sources, it was to grow rapidly during the first half of 1919, and thereafter. The central core of the movement was, no doubt, the claim of a part of the 'Iraqi educated

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

186 668 classes to 'complete independence', and resentment that this was withheld. Contributory to it as anti-Government—that is, anti-British—forces were at this stage the strains of propaganda entering the country from Turkey, from Bolshevik Russia, and from the eagerly nationalistic 'Iraqis with Faysal in Syria. Contributory also were the fears of the Mujtahids for their own position, since nothing could be more damaging to the Shi'i theocracy than a British Administration, and the specifically anti-British and anti-Christian exhortations which radiated from Karbalā and Najf from 1918 onwards. The real or fancied shortcomings of the Administration itself, elsewhere described, could add to a growing dissatisfaction: every frustration, every delay or disappointment was the fault of the British, and created new nationalists. Among the tribes, the shaykhs' rivals in every group were ready always to join an insurgent movement and to dethrone a British-supported leader; and the hunger for loot and inveterate pleasure in raiding, the dislike of revenue payment, and the conviction that British forces were withdrawing, combined to prepare the way for wholesale non-obedience or worse. The history of 1919 and early 1920 is, therefore, one of the increase and coalescence of malcontent elements until the climax of July 1920.

727 Colonel Wilson, horrified by the Anglo-French Declaration, pronounced it wholly unsuitable as a basis for government in 'Iraq. He urged that nothing but firm British administration of whatever State might be created could keep the country from anarchy; and he reacted no less strongly against suggestions by his *bête noire*, T. E. Lawrence, for the facile establishment of a group of States, 'Iraqi and Syrian, under Sharifian princes. His own earliest proposal to Whitehall was for the cautious formation of an Arab State of 'Iraq to include Mosul and, placed under an Arab Amir, to be fortified by a British High Commission and a full complement of advisers. But the difficulty of choosing an Amir was at once obvious, and the Acting Civil Commissioner reviewed in vain the claims of a Mosul notable, of the Naqib of Baghdad, of an unspecified Egyptian prince, and of a son of King Ḥusayn. Finding serious objection to all or any of these he ended by preferring that the State should for five years be ruled by Sir Percy Cox, with no Amir at all; this if anything, he felt, should both ensure efficiency and keep nationalism within bounds.

In London, Middle Eastern affairs were at this time handled by an Interdepartmental Committee presided over by Lord Curzon. In this body the Western school of British doctrine on Arab affairs prevailed over the rival Eastern or Indian school: and in it the clashing temperaments and views of Lord Curzon and Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary for India, had ample play. The Committee

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Treaty of Sèvres was to provide. Arab governors and Arab district councils would be appointed, British military and financial help would be made available. Curzon, resolute to postpone any British Government commitment over Mosul, preferred that that wilaya should form a separate Amirate ringed by 'independent' Kurdish principalities. The debate continued. The clash of French and Arab ambitions in Syria: the long failure to make peace with Turkey: American pressure in Paris for a free right of choice by the Arab populations, as exemplified by their King–Crane fact-finding commission which visited Syria in 1919: the attitude of the Council of Ten in Paris, who in January 1919 had decided on the detachment of 'Iraq from Turkey, and in March were near to agreeing on the distribution of Mandates: the wide differences of view among the British Government's own advisers on Arab affairs: the increasing call for post-war economy—or even for bag-and-baggage evacuation, or retreat to Baṣra—in the British press and Parliament: all these were scarcely reconcilable elements in reaching a clear solution of 'Iraq's future. The Baghdad Administration had as yet no clear guidance from the peace-makers in Europe on the new Mandatory idea which, propounded at Versailles by General Smuts, was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations coming to birth early in 1919, and was held especially applicable—as Article 22 of the Covenant provided—to the ex-Ottoman territories. Acceptance of this conception by Powers concerned was implicit in the Versailles Treaty, which was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified on 10 January 1920.

In 'Iraq, meanwhile, the Army visibly diminished. Garrisoned posts were abandoned, camps shrunk, effective mobile forces were fewer and ever smaller. The Civil Administration retained, indeed, always a very considerable body of popular acceptance in town and country among moderate unpolitical elements and the general public. But, as 1919 advanced, signs were not lacking that opposition to Government in its present form, so unsatisfying to nationalist aspirations, was on the increase. The local disorders in Kurdistan were reported and exaggerated. Messengers and considerable funds reached Baghdad and the Euphrates from the 'Iraqi officers now in Damascus and Aleppo, and these addressed a memorandum to the British Command in Syria, and another to the Foreign Secretary, on the need for an early national régime in 'Iraq. A distinguished Baghdadi lawyer and administrator, Naji Bey al-Suwaydi, invited from Damascus by Wilson to accept an advisory post in Baghdad, found the atmosphere uncongenial and returned unhappy to Syria. Other 'Iraqi visitors from the West reported a 'colonial' attitude in Wilson's Administration, which seemed to belittle or ignore 'Iraqi abilities. Rumours grew in

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Baghdad of the proposed Mandate over 'Iraq, soon to be allotted by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. British women and children were reported as pouring into the country as into a British colony, and in fact over 500 so entered late in 1919. The work and plans of the British civil departments seemed to suggest permanence of occupation. There had been arrests and deportations of trouble-makers—that is, said the nationalists, of patriots. Month by month the ranks of the politically-conscious were swollen. The national secondary school was established as a centre of propaganda. With the autumn the results of political preaching emanating from Syria, from Baghdad, and with increasing violence from Najf and Karbalā, became more obvious among the Euphrates tribes; and in Baghdad, where secret meetings and societies began to be reported, new and significant contacts were observed between the Sunni and Shi'i communities, with joint politico-religious conclaves and exchanges of courtesies without precedent. So passed the winter of 191[illegible].

In spite of the wide extent by this time of a potentially violent political movement, a precarious outward peace was kept throughout these months save in one district, the upper Euphrates. Threats and rumours re-echoed here from the Turks at Mardin as well as from agents of the Arab Government at Aleppo; and in mid-December 1919 Dayr al-Zur was occupied by excited Syrian tribesmen escorting a Sharifian 'Governor of the Euphrates'. A critical and humiliating situation in the town, where the Assistant Political Officer was held prisoner, ended only on Christmas Day by an arrangement between representatives of the Civil Commissioner and those of Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, Governor of Aleppo, whereby Dayr was abandoned by the British. It became a centre for propaganda, for raids, and for loud threats to annex Mosul itself. Tribesmen entered and looted Albu Kamal, Syrian tax-collectors operated far into 'Iraq. The next Governor at Dayr, himself a Mosulawi, maintained a violent and well-subsidized campaign of Sharifian propaganda, and refused all suggestions for a diplomatic settlement of the frontier. The British authorities, physically powerless in the whole area, could do no more than protest and threaten reprisals by air. The return of the Amir Faysal to Syria from Europe in March 1920 led to the withdrawal of the invaders, and early in May a frontier conference, convened at 'Ashara, agreed on a boundary line immediately west of al-Qa'im. But this settlement wholly failed to improve conditions. The Syrian-inspired looting parties and demonstrations spread over all Dulaym and Shammar territory. The belief in British apathy and impending withdrawal was universal, the Mosul–Baghdad road and railway became unsafe, and violent propaganda posters of the

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'Ahd al-'Iraqi appeared in Mosul city. The efforts of Turkish agents based on Jazira-ibn-'Umar aided those of the Sharifian officers and envoys—whose funds, as the Civil Commissioner complained, were from those supplied by the British Government itself to the Sharifian ruler of Syria. How far the Amir was aware of his too zealous supporters' activities in 'Iraq can never be known; his own attitude was correct. In the first week of June a tribal force under an 'Iraqi officer, Jamil al-Madfa'i, entered Tall 'Afar, murdered two British officers, Captain J. E. Barlow and Captain B. Stuart, and two sergeants, and moved on to threaten Mosul; but a small British column from that garrison dispersed the tribesmen and re-occupied Tall 'Afar. A precarious calm settled thereafter on the upper Euphrates and the Jazira, the Damascus Government prudently disassociating itself from this and other acts of its agents.

The situation in Baghdad and central 'Iraq had by the late spring of 1920 further deteriorated. The significant Sunni–Shi'i meetings continued, with rivalry only in inflammatory speeches. Turkish and Bolshevik agents were reputed to be at work in addition to those of Arab nationalism, of Mujtahid reaction, of tribal lawlessness, of anti-British venom. Security in Baghdad itself was affected, the bazaars closed intermittently, ugly episodes occurred. Warnings to political leaders—two Shi'i nationalists, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr and Ja'far abu al-Timman, and two Sunnis, Yusif al-Suwaydi (p. 46) and 'Ali al-Bazirgan—were unavailing, and the arrest of a petty agitator provoked angry crowds and rifle shots. Fuel was added to these flames by the Resolution of a group of 'Iraqis in Damascus which elected Fayṣal King of Syria; it resolved that the 'Iraq throne be forthwith offered to Fayṣal's elder brother, the Amir 'Abdullah. The tone and substance of House of Commons debates on Middle Eastern matters was keenly studied by 'Iraq politicians. The unpopular features of the local Administration, and its exclusion of 'Iraqi elements, continued unimproved. Finally came the news, confirming persistent rumours, that at San Remo on 28 April a Mandate for 'Iraq had been offered to Great Britain by the victorious Powers in conclave. This seeming death-blow to 'Iraqi hopes of immediate 'complete independence' was announced in Baghdad early in May with vague reassurances by the Civil Commissioner. The effect of these was not increased by the known, though unannounced, recommendations of the Bonham-Carter Committee, which Wilson had set up in March to draft a future 'Iraq Constitution: recommendations which, while well in advance of Wilson's own original views, were, with their insistence on continued British control over a structure of 'Iraqi deputies and officials, cautious and grudging to

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the point of complete unacceptability in the eyes of 'Iraqi nationalists.

An interview on 2 June, two days before the Tall 'Afar murders, between Wilson and a body of fifteen self-appointed nationalist delegates—to whom he added twenty-five more notables, selected by himself—served only to make clearer the gap between Wilsonian and nationalist views. The latter were unsatisfied by his explanations and assurances, while he continued to treat their demands for immediate independent 'Iraq nationhood as those of a malcontent clique, and to affirm that the main public of 'Iraq would be tolerant of, and safest under, what amounted to direct British rule.

The Curzon Committee, less cautious or more liberal than Wilson, had meanwhile considered the Bonham-Carter proposals and criticisms of them, and had decided that the time was ripe for an announcement on 'Iraqi constitutional advance. Under instructions from London, accordingly, the Civil Commissioner proclaimed on 17 June that a general Elective Assembly would be convened, and early progress sought towards the Constitution of an Arab State whose self-government would, while incomplete, be real and effective. But the announcement came too late. Nationalist emotion and expectation had gone too far, and forces in town and tribe were in motion that no suave phrases of a proclamation could now arrest. A few days spent in Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, now leaving the post of British Minister in Teheran, made little impression, for all his personal prestige. A Mandate, hated word, had been awarded; British rule effectively continued; of true independence there was neither sign nor early hope; and a committee of ex-Turkish deputies, headed by Sayid Talib, who had returned to 'Iraq in February 1920, pursued without effect on public opinion its labours on the machinery for holding the promised elections.

Meanwhile the drift of British armies out of 'Iraq had proceeded far. Effective troops were few and scattered. Lines of communication in 'Iraq and in Persia were long and barely defensible; and the static duties of guarding stores, Turkish prisoners, and Christian ex-Turkish refugees were calculated to employ nearly the whole surviving force. The British soldiers' families, recently arrived, were now concentrated at Karind in Persia. The military command had been held since March 1920 by an elderly General new to 'Iraq, Sir Aylmer Haldane, who showed from the first little confidence in the warnings of the Civil Commissioner and his officers: warnings which by now were those of an imminent outbreak.

1: Longrigg G-4, 8 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

adopted by the King and his entourage from the first. He had been led by Mr. Churchill in London, he complained, to envisage a very different form of Treaty: the Mandate must go, disappear, be repudiated! And if it be urged that a debatable nicety of constitutional or international law was an unrealistic or scarcely sufficient basis—and one important only to a tiny minority of 'Iraqis—on which to found, as did the political 'Iraqis of 1921 to 1930, a ten-year campaign of political struggle, marked by civil resistance, murder, and intended insurrection, it remains true that the Mandate did in fact involve an imperfect independence and an affront to national pride damaging, it was claimed, to 'Iraq in Islamic eyes everywhere.

As Treaty discussions in the Cabinet proceeded early in 1922, the strata of public opinion on the matter became clearer. Extreme nationalists, who included, for their own different reasons, the Shi'i 'Ulamā and leading supporters and even intimates of the King, cried out against mandated 'slavery' and demanded complete British evacuation: an outcry which did not fail to produce by reaction an 'English' party of notables and shaykhs favourable, they said, to effective British rule. More moderate nationalists, whose views the King personally shared, stood for abrogation of the Mandate, a friendly and equal Treaty, and continued British support. The cleavage in opinion grew more specific after a conference called at Karbalā in April 1922, nominally to protest against Ikhwan raiding, by Shaykh Mahdi al-Khalisi, a Shi'i 'Alim devoted to politics. The conference, attended by some 200 Shi'i notables, 'Ulamā, and tribesmen, was watched with uneasiness by the moderate parties, and, in spite of the colourless resolution finally passed, was effective in rallying anti-Treaty opinion; it was productive also of indiscipline and near-anarchy in the sensitive Muntafiq and Shamiya districts. A further evil now clearly visible and likely to increase was the 'political' administration in some of the Euphrates areas, by strongly nationalistic Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams. These, ignoring their advisory British colleagues, openly favoured the 'patriot' shaykhs in their land disputes and revenue assessments, and frowned upon the 'English' faction. Newspaper articles in the capital grew ever more violent, street demonstrations were attempted in Baghdad, deputations waited upon the King. The Cabinet sustained changes in March 1922, by the resignation of five ministers, who included Naji al-Suwaydi, 'Izzat Pasha of Kirkuk, and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil of Baṣra. The ministers who replaced these included Tawfiq Bey al-Khalidi, a senior official of superior type who had been a Turkish deputy and lately Mayor of Baghdad: Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, a Turko-Kurd of outstanding energy and rich humour: 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey al-Sa'dun,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a Baṣra ex-deputy of moderate views and high character: and a Shi'i business man and politician and strong nationalist, Ḥajj Ja'far abu al-Timman. This Cabinet, with the loss of Abu al-Timman, accepted the Treaty late in June 1922, but it added the proviso, resisted in vain by Cox, that it must be ratified, with the Organic Law and the Electoral Law, by the coming Constituent Assembly.

The Electoral Law had been published in May, and Cabinet approval to the Treaty was followed by a first beginning of electoral processes. Anti-Treaty feeling continued to be excited, to the grave danger of public order, by the irreconcilable 'Ulamā, by the factions and self-interests of the Euphrates shaykhs, and by a locally partisan administration. The Muntafiq situation was especially threatening, and Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, as a dominating nationalist figure, was sent there as Mutaṣarrif. Conditions elsewhere in the provinces—Dulaym, Ḥilla, Najf, Diyalā—were uneasy or even threatening. In other liwās great efforts were made by anti-Treaty (which had become synonymous with anti-British) politicians and divines to disturb tribal order, and violent trouble was momentarily expected.

Under a new Law of Associations, published in July 1921, Shi'i political elements in Baghdad formed two parties, the Waṭani (Nationalist) and the Nahdha (Awakening); these were matched by the moderate Ḥizb al-Ḥurr (Free Party) of the Naqib's eldest son, Sayid Maḥmud al-Gaylani. Early in August, further 'patriot' meetings were held in Najf and in Baghdad. The new Shi'i parties and a press characterized more by violent and irresponsible rhetoric than by sober comment or a serious news service, demanded that the public reject the Treaty and refuse to participate in elections. al-Khalisi, veering at times towards pro-Turkish views, preached hell fire against all who compromised their independence. The Cabinet, realizing that the King was at least tolerating much of the extremist opposition to themselves and their more moderate councils, resigned in a body on 14 August.

The days following were critical for the 'Iraq Kingdom. The King's attitude had, indeed, lately been one of seeming identification with the elements most violently opposed to the Treaty: a Treaty which represented the policy not only of the British Government but of the 'Iraqi Cabinet itself. Relations with the almost infinitely patient High Commissioner were rapidly worsening. Two days before the awaited Coronation-day celebrations, 23 August, the two parties issued a violent manifesto, protested openly to the King against British influence, and demanded as Prime Minister a Shi'i leader, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. At the levée itself, Sir Percy Cox was insulted deliberately by anti-British

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

demonstrators, led by a Court official, on the steps of the palace. An apology was demanded and given, but the King refused to take action against the offenders. Public order hung in the balance; no Cabinet existed. At this moment King Faysal was prostrated by an acute attack of appendicitis. The urgently necessary operation was performed by Dr. Noel Braham on 25 August; but, in advance of the King's recovery, Cox felt bound to take drastic action. He explained to the public the attitude and the responsibilities of the British Government, condemned the dangerous sedition of the extremists, suppressed the two parties and the worst of the newspapers, arrested and banished a number of the more violent politicians. The effect was instantaneous, the relief of quiet-loving elements throughout 'Iraq to all appearances profound. The gradual restoration of the tribal position was aided by the removal of Mutasarrifs whose patriotism had been shown by partial and discriminating administration, and by punitive bombing of actual insurgents in Diwaniya and the Muntafiq.

The King, whose operation was successful—and certified as such by doctors sent from the Hijaz by his father—on his complete recovery by 10 September publicly thanked the High Commissioner for the measures taken; they had, in fact, saved the State from anarchy and himself, it is probable, from a second throneless exile. The Naqib was asked in the improved atmosphere to form another Cabinet, in which he included Khalidi at Justice, 'Abd al-Muhsin at Interior, Sasun Hasqayl, Ja'far al-'Askari, 'Ali Fadhil, and Subih Nasha't at their former Ministries, and a rich Najf banker, Hajj Muhsin al-Shallash at Education. The Ministry of Commerce was abolished. The Cabinet, reassured at last by the argument that entry to the League of Nations—'Iraq's next goal—would of itself end the unpopular Mandate, reaffirmed its acceptance of the Treaty, which was signed at last by the Naqib and Sir Percy Cox on 10 October 1922.

The Treaty, which was to last for twenty years after ratification by the Constituent Assembly, reproduced, without direct reference to the Mandate, most of its provisions. It covered the obligation to respect constitutional procedure, freedom of religion and education and missionary enterprise. It included safeguards for the rights of foreigners, equal economic opportunities for all States (whether League members or not: an echo of the Colby–Curzon 'Open Door' correspondence), co-operation with League of Nations international Health measures, and a modern régime for Antiquities. The terms of the Treaty were open to periodical agreed revision, and Great Britain agreed to press the candidature of 'Iraq for the League of Nations 'as soon as possible'. Separate and subsidiary agreements were to be made—and were in fact thereafter drafted—

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where electoral rolls for the Constituent Assembly were already under preparation, and provoked punitive missions of the Air Force. By autumn, still protesting his devotion to the British Government, he was again in hopeful correspondence with the Turks and, supported by money looted from the tobacco merchants, planned an attack on Kirkuk and collected 'taxes' from the Ḥalabja and Chamchamal villages. So passed the winter of 1923–4.

4. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The signature of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty on 10 October 1922 was followed by further drafting and redrafting, in Baghdad and London, of the promised Organic Law; by the completion, and ultimate signature on 4 March 1924, of the four subsidiary Agreements: and, months before these were ready, by the acceptance of a Protocol to the Treaty itself. The Protocol resulted in part from increased British realization of 'Iraqi sentiment on mandatory matters, but still more from pressure by the press and public of the United Kingdom on its Government—and particularly on Bonar Law, the incoming Prime Minister—to diminish British expenditure and commitments in 'Iraq. It was brought back to Baghdad by Cox from London in March 1923, and signed by himself and 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey on the last day of April. Reducing the Treaty period from twenty to four years, it could not fail of a warm reception by King and politicians alike: only the 'Inglizi' party among the shaykhs and notables, still distrustful of the young Government and fearful of their own rivals, pronounced it a betrayal. The signature of the Protocol, Sir Percy Cox's last act in 'Iraq, was followed on 5 May by his departure. He had, by his intelligence, patience, and benevolent firmness rendered outstanding services to the State. The post of High Commissioner was assumed by no unworthy successor in Sir Henry Dobbs, who had served at Baṣra in the earliest occupation days and returned from India to 'Iraq as Sir Percy's Counsellor late in 1923.

The improved atmosphere and the enthusiastic welcome accorded to the King on his triumphant tours in both northern and southern 'Iraq availed in no way to conciliate the Shi'i 'Ulamā. Their anti-British fulminations, in which a pro-Turkish element was at times strangely visible, were coupled with a renewal in June 1923 of the anti-election Fatwas. The clash between their policy and their Government's was explicit; and when, late in June, a bazaar episode brought the sons of Shaykh Mahdi al-Khaliṣi into conflict with the police, the King was willing to authorize the arrest of both sons and father. Brought to Baṣra, they left the country and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. In Najf

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the bazaars were closed in condemnation of this outrage to the men of learning, a party of whom gathered to withdraw in dudgeon from ungrateful 'Iraq. These proceeded to Karbalā, were deaf to Government reassurances, and with diminished numbers left 'Iraq for Kirmanshah. Here the holy men awaited with complete confidence the results of so striking a gesture. But there were none. Even in the Holy Cities no commotion followed; Sunni observers were delighted; to the Government it was a veritable answer to prayer, and the dutiful protests of the Persian Government fell on deaf ears in Baghdad. A mediating visit to 'Iraq by the British Minister in Teheran was fruitless. Only after a formal approach to the Prime Minister by spokesmen of the 'Ulamā in November 1923, with protestations of a change of heart and policy, were their self-exiled colleagues permitted to return on the condition of abstention from politics henceforward. The main body re-entered 'Iraq in April 1924, still influential but never to regain their old dominion in the country's affairs.

The field thus clear, election machinery could start to operate. Uneasiness among the Kurds and Turkomans of Kirkuk and Arbil at the prospect of 'Arab Government' was calmed by the High Commissioner. Some ambiguity in the legal provisions for tribal representation was cleared up; tribesmen, it was ruled by the Ministry of Justice, could register as ordinary voters in addition to enjoying their specific representation by twenty deputies. So novel a concession to the tribes, for whom Turkish conceptions had provided no voice at all, was obnoxious to the conservatives of Sayid Maḥmud's Free Party, and disrupted it to vanishing-point. The voters of Sulaymaniya liwā, of whom numbers had perforce registered in Kirkuk while their own headquarter town was beyond control, completed their own liwā rolls and could choose their own deputies when in 1924 it was reoccupied (p. 152). By the mid-March of that year the procedure of primary and secondary election was complete.

The Cabinet of 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey had by November 1923 reached a stage of *malaise* which presaged the end. It was due to discord with the Shi'i element and to some disagreements with the King. Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari, who had returned from Geneva to spend a few valuable days as Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, was invited by the King to form the Cabinet which should face the Constituent Assembly. Accepting the charge, he retained two Shi'i ministers including Muḥsin al-Shallash at Finance, brought to Interior 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi (a modern-minded ex-officer who had acted as Mutaṣarrif of Ḥilla), and completed his team with Ṣubiḥ Nasha't, Nuri Sa'id, and the eminent Mosul and Baṣra notables, Sayid Aḥmad al-Fakhri and Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan, in other

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927, the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni schoolmaster, began a sequence of events which involved ministerial intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day, by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned, and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i 'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between 'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January 1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect 'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

by British troops, who will decline the task.' The National Service Bill, introduced into Parliament, met the urgent Shi'i and Kurdish opposition already described. Detested by Shi'ism and dreaded by the little-considered man-in-the-street, the project became the darling of the 'Iraqi press which saw in British caution a proof of their sinister desire to keep 'Iraq weak and helpless. Successive Cabinets were in doubt whether to drop the project amid the scorn of newspaper patriots and the Army itself, or to press it to the point of probable explosion with Shi'i and Kurd.

Under the Treaty of January 1926 the question of 'Iraq's membership of the League was to be reviewed in January 1928 and thereafter four-yearly. The British Government notified 'Iraq in July 1927 that it would consider a recommendation for such membership in 1932, but not in 1928; but this, disappointing as it was to eager 'Iraqi statesmen, did not preclude attempts to obtain a better interim status. Conversations were held in London late in 1927. The King, the Prime Minister and other ministers, and the High Commissioner participated in these with Colonial Office spokesmen; and, after a position approaching deadlock had been reached, terms were agreed. A new Treaty was signed by Ja'far Pasha and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on 14 December. Its validity, subject to approval by the League Council as well as by the 'Iraq Parliament, was dependent also on a revision of the Military and Financial Agreements.

The new Treaty marked a certain, but no great, advance. It admitted that the 1922 and 1926 Treaties had been already in a measure superseded by events, notably that of 'Iraq's own progress; it treated 'Iraq explicitly as an independent sovereign State, and dealt with its internal and international obligations as such; and by its terms the British Government undertook to support 'Iraq's candidature for League membership in 1932 'provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval'. It was largely by reason of this proviso that the draft Treaty was coldly greeted in 'Iraq by almost all political elements.

It formed, nevertheless, part of the inheritance assumed by the Ministry which, under 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'dun, succeeded that of Ja'far Pasha on 14 January 1928: a Ministry which included two Shi'is, a Christian, and a body of experienced politicians. The moderate and experienced ex-Mutaṣarrif 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Qaṣṣab was at Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman at Justice, the Christian economist and business man Yusif Ghanima at Finance, the Najf banker Muḥsin al-Shallash at Works, and another shrewd and experienced Shi'i, Salman Barrak of Ḥilla, as Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture. Naji al-Suwaydi's clever and progressive younger brother, Tawfiq, came to the Ministry of Education, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 a veteran nationalist, Shaykh Aḥmad al-Da'ud, to Awqaf. The
648* former coalition being now disrupted, the Prime Minister called
[665] for a general election. His shrewd organization of the Progressive Party, and the power of the executive to influence electors' choice, secured him a majority of 66 out of 88 seats after elections peaceably conducted. The new Chamber contained 26 Shi'is and 16 Kurds. In face of the delicacy of the conscription question, the influence of an Opposition stronger than was suggested by the fewness of its parliamentary spokesmen, and the thunders of the parties with their hotly anti-British and anti-Treaty press, no progress on controversial issues could be made. Amendments to the Agreements subsidiary to the Treaty were lengthily discussed between ministers and the High Commissioner, but no agreement was in sight. 'Iraqi demands for complete and immediate control of its own defence, for abrogation of the provision that joint Anglo-'Iraqi forces should be under British command, and for abolition of the Customs exemptions enjoyed by British forces, were all unacceptable; and without accord on these matters there could be no Treaty. Conscription was, amid bitter Opposition criticism, dropped for the moment from the Progressives' programme.

665 The Sunni–Shi'i position meanwhile improved, thanks to the
• 668 efforts of the wiser men on both sides. The Nahḍha Party lost
180 support, and political emotions were directed rather in common against what they felt to be the ever-present and ever-obstructive British. The year 1928 saw the worst phases of the 'peculiar situation' (*al-Wadha' al-Shadh*) beloved as a theme for vituperation by 'Iraqi journalists and humorists. The 'peculiarity' was that of independence—under a Mandate: ministerial responsibility—under advisory watchfulness: aspiration to military strength—but with conscription 'forbidden'; a port and a railway administered by 'Iraq—but the property of others: privileges for foreigners in 'Iraq—but none for 'Iraqis abroad: and in general the ambiguities, overlappings, and frustrations of an adolescent society and Government impatient to be rid of the foreign control, condescension, and wiseacre advice which its politicians never wholly trusted and frequently misunderstood.

*645 'Abd al-Muḥsin, thwarted as he felt by the British and the Opposition alike, resigned office in January 1929. Remaining as head of a caretaker Government until superseded, he pledged his party to support no Government that did not insist on radical amendments in the two Agreements. The successor Ministry, formed in April by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, belonged equally to the Progressive Party and could attempt little. The Ministers of Interior, Finance, Works, and Irrigation—Qaṣṣab, Ghanima,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

manner an occupation', and 'in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of 'Iraq'. The latter's forces were to be aided by Great Britain with arms, equipment, and training: in time of war British forces were to enjoy 'all facilities and assistance' in 'Iraq's power to give, and free movement by land, air, and water. The British representative at Baghdad was to hold ambassadorial rank and to enjoy precedence over other diplomats. The Treaty was to have a life of twenty years.

A new Financial Agreement, for which the Treaty provided, arranged for the cession of abandoned British camps and aerodromes to 'Iraq within five years, for the transfer of the 'Iraq Railways to an *ad hoc* Corporation, and for that of the Port of Basra to a Port Trust. Foreign officials needed by the 'Iraq Government were to be British, and the conditions of service of those already employed would remain unaffected.

Even before Treaty revision had reached its final stage, negotiations had been in progress for the replacement of the 1924 Judicial Agreement, in which the surviving remnants of the old Turkish Capitulatory régime ill accorded with 'Iraq's future status. The new Agreement, initialed by Nuri Pasha and the High Commissioner on the same day as the Treaty and ratified on 4 March 1931, provided for 'a uniform system of justice . . . applicable to all 'Iraqis and foreigners alike'. To facilitate this a number of British lawyers, later determined as nine, were to be employed for a period in the Courts and the Ministry of Justice. Certain alterations in the Criminal Code and in the rules of evidence were to be made (and were made in fact) before the Agreement took effect. Communicated to the League of Nations, this Agreement was approved on condition that all ex-Capitulatory Powers accepted the new position of their subjects in 'Iraq under it. They did so without exception within a few months: an acceptance which went far to render 'Iraq's new status acceptable to other nations.

Even accompanied as it was by an understanding with the High Commissioner for the immediate reduction of British officials, whereunder the ubiquitous Administrative Inspectors were in fact diminished in number and largely recalled from the provinces to Baghdad, the Treaty was received without enthusiasm in 'Iraq, and was, for opposite reasons, sternly criticized by many spokesmen in Great Britain. By the 'Iraq minorities immediate alarm was felt, as will appear later; by the ultra-nationalist politicians it was hailed, by reason of such British privileges as were to survive, as a mere continuance of 'slavery'. The Prime Minister decided upon a general election to strengthen his Ministry's position and to determine, at least ostensibly, the nation's attitude. The Nationalist Party, not content with an attempted boycott of the elections,

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and the fullest activity of their press articles, hand-bills, and oratory, did not hesitate to invoke the authority of the Shi'i Mujtahids in condemnation of the new Treaty. These, however, declined for once to intervene, except partially at Samarrā, and the elections were peacefully conducted in the districts; only at Sulaymaniya a major clash between violent demonstrators and the police resulted in bloodshed and the loss of a score of lives. All results were known by the end of October 1930, and showed a sweeping victory of the Government party. The ratification of the Treaty by Parliament, which met as usual on 1 November, could not now be prevented by the fierce denunciations of die-hard patriots; the voting was in favour by 69 against 13 in the Chamber, 11 against 5 in the Senate.

But much remained to be done, both in Baghdad and in Geneva. Parliament sat on, immersed in legislation and in vehement politics, until the midsummer of 1931. The opposition to the Sa'idi Ministry had by that time been reorganized in a grouping more formidable than the isolated Nationalist Party which, thanks to the usual control exercised by the liwā officials, had made so poor a showing in the elections. Political leaders hostile to Nuri and, with reservations, to the Treaty—Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-Suwaydi, Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani, and 'Ali Jawdat who had resigned from the Cabinet in September and been succeeded by Rustum Ḥaydar from the Palace—formed from the Nationalist and the People's Parties and like-thinking elements a Party of National Brotherhood—Ḥizb al-Ikhā al-Waṭani. At its inaugural meeting in March 1931 its objects were stated to include the dissolution of a flagrantly unrepresentative Parliament and the formation of a new Government 'pledged to reconsider the external relations of 'Iraq'. Certain of its members as a gesture thought fit to resign their seats in the Chamber; all resolved to pursue their campaign in the press and country. Nuri Pasha on his side had already formed, from deputies favourable to him, the 'Ahd (Covenant) Party, with an appeal to the great days of al-'Ahd and a programme of Treaty implementation.

Among the first acts of the Ikhā was the organization in July 1931 of a series of strikes in the 'Iraq townships without precedent for their concerted timing and wide extent. They had little object but the embarrassment of Government. The trades' organizations in the bazaars took fright—or were maliciously alarmed—at a clause in the newly passed Municipal Taxation Law which could be read as unfavourable to them. The misunderstanding, which was easily elucidated by Government, was encouraged to persist, and it was not until late in July, after attempts had been made to spread unrest to northern 'Iraq, and disorder in Baṣra and the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Euphrates towns had led to bloodshed and police intervention, that the agitation died down: the product, it seemed, of a new and sinister type of 'Iraqi politics. The Brotherhood, successful in this effort, proceeded next (said its enemies) to make what capital it could from the dangerous uneasiness of Kurd–Arab and Assyrian–Kurd relationships.

The attitude of the minorities to the forthcoming emancipation of 'Iraq and withdrawal of British control could not, indeed, be other than a serious preoccupation of the 'Iraq Government as well as of Great Britain and of the League itself. In Baghdad the privileges claimed by or on behalf of the Kurdish districts, and the future of the Assyrians, were questions the more insistent as the attention of the League was concentrated on these aspects of 'Iraq life. The Government did its best at reassurance by repeated tours of the King and his Ministers in the Kurdish areas, by legislation on the use of the Kurdish language, by promises to honour all pledges given in the past, and by such practical gestures of goodwill as were available; but the whispers of the ill disposed were effective, nevertheless, in increasing the alarm of Kurd and Assyrian alike.

With minor Cabinet changes—the loss of Madfa'i to preside in the Deputies, and the addition of Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji in Foreign Affairs—and a re-formation in October 1930, the Ministry of Nuri Pasha maintained itself, in spite of Brotherhood intrigues and assaults, from its formation in March 1930 until November 1932. His second Cabinet, which took office on 19 October, brought Naji Shawkat to Interior, Rustum to Finance, Jamal Baban to Justice, Ja'far to Foreign Affairs, Amin Zaki and Chalabi to Works and Education. Little was heard for the moment of Sunni–Shi'i friction, save implicitly in minor disorders: and nothing of the threat or hope of conscription, which the Sa'idi Government wisely postponed until the obligation to listen to High Commissioners was no more. The major interest of the time was, evidently, that of securing 'Iraq's admission to the League, for which 1932 was the appointed year.

The intention of His Majesty's Government to make this recommendation had been communicated to the League Council in September 1929, and was likely thenceforward to raise questions of procedure for which no precedent existed. The Permanent Mandates Commission, to which annually since 1921 spokesmen of the mandatory Power had presented its Report with full verbal explanations, had never relaxed its interest in 'Iraqi affairs and the British trusteeship. It now scrutinized the 1929 Report for signs of 'Iraq's adequacy or inadequacy for emancipation, closely questioned the British 'accredited representative' at Geneva, and

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year following demonstrations in the mosques and city, a two-minute silence in Parliament, black-edged newspapers, and telegrams to London marked 'Iraqi disapproval of the 'pro-Jewish' policy of Great Britain. But the day when these feelings would descend with personal violence on the heads of the timid and law-abiding Baghdadi Jews, anxious only to find a secure place in the State and to dissociate themselves from Zionism, lay still some years ahead.

The Yazidis, no longer eminent as of old either as harriers or as harried in tribal warfare, turned to restlessness towards the end of this period through the heedless and dissolute ways of their Mir, Sa'id Bey. He was accused of misusing the revenues and neglecting the shrine of Shaykh 'Adi and its pilgrims. A meeting of the Yazidi notables was held in Mosul in 1931, attended by the High Commissioner. Government attempted to produce a satisfactory statute for the outlandish community; but it proved intractable, and the Yazidi elders reported after full deliberation that no way could be devised to change their Mir except assassination. Rival Mirs nevertheless claimed support, and faction tore their settlements in the Mosul plain and Sinjar, to be settled only by time, intrigue, and murder.

The Kurds were a far more formidable minority. Added to the other elements making for separatism—those of locality, character, culture, and tradition—their specific nationalism, which flourished in a restricted circle centred in Sulaymaniya town, had survived their incorporation in the 'Iraq State, the failure of successive campaigns, the stern suppression of their Kurdish brothers in Turkey and Persia, and even their own profound disunion. The 'Iraq Government had made meanwhile a not discreditable effort to honour in their favour the League of Nations recommendations of 1925. They were given a generous share of Government appointments, a minister in the Baghdad Cabinet, and their quota of Deputies delighted to serve as such. Nevertheless, a petition submitted by some of the last-mentioned in 1929, asking for increased expenditure in Kurdistan and the formation of an all-Kurdish four-liwā province of their own, showed their determination to maintain all of their special claims; nor did their spokesmen forget that the twenty-year prolongation of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty of 1922—a specific condition of the Mosul settlement—was largely on their account.

Meanwhile it was possible in 1927 to arrange tolerable terms of surrender with Shaykh Maḥmud. But he refused, after all, to honour them, and it proved necessary to dislodge him from his last stronghold in Panjwin by forces of the 'Iraq Army and the Levies, and by bombing and cavalry patrols to disperse his widely-ranging

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murderous Hamawand allies. The Shaykh's retirement to Persia removed for a time the greatest obstacle to orderly government in Sulaymaniya liwā. It could now be resumed, with improved roads and rebuilt police posts. His son, Baba 'Ali, was brought to school in Baghdad—and later to Victoria College, Alexandria—as part of the terms of settlement; he was, years later, to become a graduate of Columbia, and a minister of the Government. The place of Shaykh Maḥmud as leading Kurdish disturber of the peace was taken in the same year, 1927, by Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan in whose territory 'Iraqi troops had recently manœuvred. This half-witted Dere Bey, obscurely prompted by some resentful megalomania, now proclaimed himself Almighty and gained some converts by the preaching of a devoted Mullā. But the reaction of horrified listeners led to a scuffle in which lives, including his brother's, were lost. It was followed by an intervention of police and the reinforcement of the Army garrison at Bilih, near Barzan. The new religion died out; but the Shaykh, talking and writing war and sedition to all who would listen and spreading rumours of Assyrian trespass, remained a menacing figure.

The Kurdish reaction in 1929–30 to threatened British withdrawal was one of apprehension. The elections of September 1929 produced, as has been recorded, a riot in Sulaymaniya; questions had been asked already by the Kurds in the 'Iraq Parliament as to safeguarding in the new Treaty the 'rights of the Kurdish areas', and had been answered only by the Treaty's silence on the subject.

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Expecting support based on the same claims, Shaykh Maḥmud in September 1930 again invaded 'Iraq territory, in spite of specific warnings to desist. He established himself, addressed the High Commissioner to demand a united Kurdistan under British Mandate to stretch from Zakho to Khaniqin, and again occupied Panjwin. Troops of the 'Iraq Army, with Royal Air Force bombers, dislodged him successively from Panjwin and Sardasht, but failed for some months to encircle or drive him across the frontier. Guerrilla war continued through the winter of 1930–1. In March his movement to raise the tribes of Kifri and Khaniqin was stopped by a concerted operation of the Army, Police, and Air Force, and a major engagement took place at Au-i-Barika twenty miles north-east of Ṭuz Khurmatu, leaving a score of dead. The Shaykh fled into Persia, but thanks to preventive action by the Persian Government failed to find there his usual refuge. At an interview at Panjwin terms were once more arranged. His life was spared, an allowance granted, and his place of residence fixed at Naṣiriya on the lower Euphrates.

Between 1928 and 1931 an uneasy peace reigned in Barzan country, where the Shaykh was visited by an Administrative

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

Inspector and received the admonitions of Baghdad. In July of the latter year he again lost his wits, accepted and imposed 'Christianity', and ordered his scared followers to conform to his new faith by roasting and eating pork. A number of the horrified retinue obeyed; but a neighbour, Shaykh Rashid of Baradost, expressed his disapproval by raids which kindled all the fires of tribal warfare. Shaykh Aḥmad's brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, and other well-wishers tried in vain by diplomacy to extinguish them: but he himself, restored to the Muslim faith, led forays of unusual savagery into Baradost country. By December intervention by regular troops was ordered, in spite of the wintry conditions. An 'Iraq Army column, penetrating the mountains as far as the Shaykh's village, was there severely defeated and indeed rescued from débâcle only by Air Force intervention. Aḥmad, chastened by severe bombing, released the prisoners he had taken, protested humble obedience, and withdrew from Baradost country. But he remained unsubdued. In the early spring of 1932, after warnings from the High Commissioner which he ignored, 'Iraqi troops again advanced into his country, occupied Margasur, and threatened Barzan; but a sudden assault on them by tribesmen in difficult country involved them in a second defeat and heavy losses. The R.A.F. was again able decisively to intervene, and a second 'Iraqi column, with strong air support, now occupied Barzan and much of its dependent territory. After a pause for the release of a captured pilot, and further attempts at peace-making on generous terms, land and air operations were resumed. In midsummer the Shaykh, driven finally to bay, crossed into Turkish territory, where he was arrested and removed from the frontier. It was then possible to install a normal or nearly normal administration in Barzan country, with police posts and patrols, and to pardon the miserable remnant of the Shaykh's followers who trickled back.

If these warlike interludes were of a type normal in Kurdistan for millennia, the same is less true of the political action now taken by Kurdish leaders. A petition to Geneva by ten notables of Sulaymaniya in July 1930 demanded a League-supervised Kurdish Government. The Permanent Mandates Commission commented that the League had never envisaged a Kurdish Government but merely a measure of 'special treatment', of which it urged the Mandatary to ensure full application before it be too late. A series of further and similar Kurdish petitions, written in 1930 to 1931, were considered at Geneva in the latter year. They led to the recommendation that Britain should impress on the 'Iraq Government the need of tolerance to evoke the loyalty of its Kurdish subjects: who in turn, however, should earn respect and the League's consideration by a correct attitude to the 'Iraqi Kingdom.

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563 repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retro-
701 spect, to be regretted.

The announcement of the impending end of the Mandate pro-
563 foundly disturbed the Assyrian community, which under the 1930
668 Treaty was so shortly to be left at the sole mercy of the 'Iraq Government. The latter's attitude, though still correct, was growing less favourable. Taxation remissions were granted on a decreasing scale; normal minor taxation, outrageous to the long-pampered settlers, was beginning to be demanded; and Government action in admitting parties of destitute Assyrians from Russia was reluctant and unpopular. Persistent British support for Assyrian claims, or part of them, was galling to successive Cabinets. Worse than this, the exploitation of bad relations between Kurd and Assyrian appealed to certain Baghdad politicians as an easy method of trouble-making. It bore fruit in a series of untraced murders and revived anti-Assyrian outcry among the Kurds. Nevertheless, if the Assyrian community had, with patience and avoidance of provocation, accepted its new position in 'Iraq—which was that or better than that of the Chaldaeans or Armenians—its future could have been peaceful if inglorious, its ecclesiastical and social individuality preserved, and its homes secure and happy. But its leaders chose other paths, which led to tragedy. They clung to every point of their reiterated case: that they had been officially 'allies' in the 1914–18 War, but as such never rewarded; that their Levies had performed outstanding services—indeed had acquired and saved southern Kurdistan; that the League had in 1925 recommended rebestowal of their 'ancient privileges', now still withheld; that the British had ruined their hopes of Turkish favour and resettlement in Hakkari, and had betrayed them at Geneva. The twenty-year-old Ishai Mar Sham'un, at school in England from 1925 to 1929 and wholly ignorant of 'Iraq realities, was unfitted to guide the community and obsessed by unrealistic conceptions. Chief among these was that of the 'temporal power' which he felt to belong to the headship of a Millet almost self-governing in olden days, however unacceptable and unconstitutional it must be in modern 'Iraq. His father was ultra-conservative; in his aunt, Surma Khanim, the fervour of community feeling had by now vanquished judgement; the bishops and maliks failed in wisdom or pursued sectional aims, and in conspicuous cases even led factions against their Patriarch. Enthusiastic well-wishers from outside—one an Anglicized grandson of Layard's assistant, Hormuzd Rassam, and one an Englishman, Matthew Cope—misused their well-meant influence to organize petitions, to raise false hopes, and further to prejudice Assyrian-'Iraqi relations.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The High Commissioner's deputy at Geneva in November 1930 gave reassurances, which he believed to be justified, on the future prospects of this and the other minorities. In the same year Sir Francis Humphrys dealt with the Rassam petitions and pledged the 'moral responsibility' of Great Britain for the future attitude of the 'Iraq Government. Returned to 'Iraq, and faced with a situation deteriorating largely through the Assyrians' own activities, he again recommended the Government to show all possible goodwill by resuming its taxation-remission policy. This was done, with good effect. It would have been followed by re-attempting, on attractive terms, the long postponed Baradost settlement, had not the outbreak of Barzan–Baradost hostilities precluded it.

In October 1931 a conference of Assyrians convened at Mosul by the Mar Sham'un dispatched petitions to Geneva. They requested that since the community could not face conditions in 'Iraq after termination of the Mandate, it should be transferred *en bloc* to some Western-governed territory elsewhere, or to Syria. These petitions, however, were not considered by the Mandates Commission for thirteen months, and meanwhile the alarmed Assyrians decided on direct action. The Mar Sham'un prepared in May 1932 a plan to concentrate the whole community in the area of Dohuk–'Amadiya in July, and a general 'cessation of service' by all the Levies on 1 June was threatened in a memorial handed at Hinaydi to their Commander, Brigadier J. G. Browne, himself a tireless upholder of Assyrian rights and later historian of the Levies. The intervention of the High Commissioner postponed a crisis, and yet another petition to Geneva was prepared; but the threat of mass resignation was repeated in the event of its having no early or favourable issue. This petition demanded recognition of an Assyrian Millet and of its Patriarch's temporal and spiritual authority, with an Assyrian deputy in Parliament, community schools, and a subsidy for the Patriarch himself and for his Church. It asked also for the annexation of Ḥakkari territory to 'Iraq, or alternatively the formation in 'Iraq of an all-Assyrian liwā to the north of Mosul, with a new and well-considered Settlement and clear land-titles.

The Levy strike was in fact averted by the arrival by air—an operation then hailed as remarkable—of a battalion of British troops from Egypt. Its four companies were posted to the four main Levy stations. The Mar Sham'un, influenced by this step and by Humphrys's representations, agreed to order the Levies to remain at duty until the petition of 17 June should have been considered at Geneva. The Levy personnel at Hinaydi, who alone continued insubordinate, were reduced by the release of some 250 men; elsewhere the impending reductions of Levy strength

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 668 were postponed at the Mar Sham'un's request. The Northamptonshires returned to Egypt.

In partial compliance with requests in the petition, the 'Iraq Government set up a further land-finding committee. It discovered but little land both cultivable and available, but recommended expenditure on an irrigation scheme to produce more. The Cabinet accepted this report, which was sent to Geneva. The King visited 'Amadiya, talked at length with the Mar Sham'un, and used every means to win his confidence; but the young and intransigent Patriarch would commit himself to nothing in advance of the League's answer, and himself left for Switzerland. He was followed there by a counter-petition of those Assyrians whose original homes had been in Barwari Bala (that is, in present 'Iraq territory), expressing their complete satisfaction with present arrangements.

The final debates of the Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Council on the Assyrian issue, after rehearsing that community's well-known grievances and the desirability (but impossibility) of providing the homogeneous group-settlement which they demanded, could result in no more than hopes for the best. The gap between the full Millet autonomy demanded by the Mar Sham'un, and the favourable minority treatment available at best from the 'Iraq Government, was a wide one. The League Council formally rejected the Millet proposal, 'noted with satisfaction' the impending appointment of a foreign settlement expert, and left the subject with misgivings which were soon to be tragically justified.

5. GOVERNORS AND GOVERNED

642 647 In a community at 'Iraq's current stage of evolution the central Administration was both significant of and powerful in the society of the territory; and great and not unsuccessful efforts were made from 1925 to 1932 by the 'Iraqi and British elements alike to improve it. The reduction of the British part,[1] though accompanied by a variously assessed loss of efficiency and authority, was clearly necessary as part of 'Iraq's planned evolution; and it proceeded so far that the steps taken towards 'Iraqi administrative independence in these years left relatively little for the post-647 mandatory period. By 1932 further departments had been taken over by 'Iraqi directors—those of Revenue and State Domains

[1] The number of Administrative Inspectors fell from 24 in 1923 to 18 in 1925, 14 in 1930, 10 in 1933. The total of British officials of 'gazetted' status in 1920 was 364, in 1923: 181, in 1926: 148, in 1929: 130, in 1931: 118 (38 advisory, 80 executive). For British 'non-gazetted' staff the corresponding numbers were: for 1920: 484; for 1923: 361; for 1926: 52; for 1929: 34; for 1931: 28; for Indian officials, in 1920: 2,035, in 1923: 1,270, in 1926: 250, in 1929: 53, and in 1931: 36.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

political unity today. A further obstacle must be the intolerant individualism of the Arab character, so recalcitrant to self-subordination and compromise. These difficulties were all to be faced when twelve years later Arab Unity was to become, largely under 'Iraqi inspiration, a formal political reality; and they were to prove formidable.

2. ASSYRIAN CLIMAX

The administrative and political features of 'Iraq life as these existed in 1932 had been current already for three years or more; there was consequently little sign of sudden change in the autumn of that year to indicate the removal of restraints and growth of dangerous tendencies which the last pages have described. Nuri Pasha Sa'id was not anxious to prolong his premiership; his position, strong in Parliament, had been heavily attacked outside by the Ikhā and the Nationalist Party. Their newspapers, repeatedly suppressed and as often reappearing, assailed the Treaty, the British, and the Cabinet, until a 'Law for the prohibition of harmful propaganda' was passed to restrain them. The Liberal or Reformist group now forming among the lawyers, the journalists, and the impatient 'enlightened' elements, who were turning for the first time to social questions as the background of politics, hoped to range itself and its newspaper, the *Ahali* (People), with a more progressive Government. The King and his advisers thought in terms of specific advances, adapted to the new times: advances towards greater national unity—Sunni–Shi'i, landlord–tenant, tribe–town, and Kurd–Arab—better administration, more devolution, and a stronger Army. Such a programme could best be realized by an all-party Administration, and this must indicate a Cabinet of the Ikhā with 'Ahd and independent elements. Moreover, ill-feeling based on personal and private matters, perhaps even on some tinge of royal jealousy at Nuri's successes, had rendered the Pasha's position barely tenable.

But the Ikhā–Nationalist pact was still recent, and the King could not admit the only condition on which Yasin Pasha and Rashid 'Āli, now Chief of the Royal Diwan, and their associates would accept office: that of Treaty revision. The compromise adopted, therefore, was that of a neutral Government headed by Naji Shawkat. It included eminent lawyers—the cautious and able Nasrat al-Farsi, Jamil al-Wadi, and Jalal Baban—a distant cousin of Jamal Baban, and like him a Kurd for ministerial purposes—in the Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Works: Rashid al-Khawja, an able ex-officer who had been Mutasarrif of Baghdad, in Defence: a competent and moderate Shi'i, 'Abbas Mahdi, in Education: and the prudent 'Abd al-Qadir Rashid in Foreign Affairs. The

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 new Ministry, formed early in November 1932, was viewed without enthusiasm by the moderates and with disdain by the Ikhā. Its programme, the usual list of impeccable and largely unrealizable objectives, did little to consolidate it; and Naji Shawkat decided to provide it with greater parliamentary support by a general election. The 'Ahd Party of Nuri Sa'id was allowed to die.

666 The elections, boycotted in vain by Abu al-Timman's party, produced a reasonably representative Chamber willing to support Naji's Government; and this in turn was prepared to exchange its provisional character for one of permanence. But the opening of the Extraordinary Session of Parliament on 3 March 1933 revealed it as evocative of small enthusiasm, exposed to strong Ikhā attacks, and unadapted to meet the King's desire for an all-party Ministry which should include all his outstanding statesmen. Naji Shawkat, pleading ill-health, resigned.

645 661 The formation of a Government under Rashid 'Āli, in the presence of a Chamber just elected with an anti-Ikhā majority, well illustrated the paradoxical but habitual relationship between 'Iraqi Cabinets and Parliament. The rank and file of the Deputies, elected as supporters of White, would complacently sustain Black; their seats rather than any body of principles were at stake. Rashid 'Āli began by demanding freedom to move for Treaty revision, but was persuaded by the King—who used, it was said, the threat of abdication itself—to renounce this; and on 20 March 1933 he announced a Cabinet which, with himself as Premier, included Yasin Pasha in the Ministry of Finance, Hikmat Sulayman in that of Interior, Nuri Sa'id in Foreign Affairs, Rustum Haydar in Works, Jalal Baban in Defence, 'Abbas Mahdi in Education, and a lawyer new to ministerial rank, Muhammad Zaki al-Baṣri, in Justice.

645 648 The new Government, hailed as one of genuine national co-operation and quick to publish an admirable programme of reform, had nevertheless lost the support of the nationalists by its weakening on the Treaty issue. A manifesto issued by these in June denounced the Government, and signs appeared that this resentment, in the dangerous councils of Najf and the Euphrates, could take a sectarian colouring and, by insistence on Shi'i demands, could represent a menace to security; once again a single element in the State was not unwilling to invoke tribal violence to coerce a newly established Government of National Unity. The tragic events of August 1933 were, however, to save the Ikhā Government from this danger by temporarily uniting all 'Iraq in their favour as saviours of the nation.

643 The King, invited to England on a well-timed State visit, left his son the Amir Ghazi, now aged twenty-one, as Regent. He

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passage of a law authorizing conscription, at long last, was received with seeming indifference.

Late in August Madfa'i offered his resignation. The Chief of the Royal Diwan, 'Ali Jawdat, whose favourable position to influence the King and to arrange suitable alliances had not been neglected, himself accepted the premiership and the Ministry of the Interior on 28 August. His place in the Palace was taken by Rustum Haydar. Nuri Sa'id re-entered the Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Madfa'i in that of Defence. To the Ministry of Works came Arshad al-'Umari, a Turkish-trained civil engineer of the famous Mosul family, to Finance the Christian economist, Yusif Ghanima, and to Education 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi.

The first act of 'Ali Jawdat was to dissolve Parliament—a step doubtfully constitutional and condemned by the Ikhā, but necessary to secure parliamentary support. He went to lengths unusual even in 'Iraq, it was claimed by his opponents, in instructing the liwā officials on the personalities to be returned to the Chamber. The resulting Parliament met in the first week of 1934. Packed with the Premier's nominees, it was unrepresentative of the Ikhā opposition, poor in tribal spokesmen, and proportionately unjust to the Shi'is; nor did 'Ali Jawdat's initiative in founding a Party of National Unity, which barely attained life before expiring, produce the desired co-operation. The election procedure was strongly criticized in the Chamber of Deputies; the Senate opposed the régime to the extent of absenting themselves from their House; Baghdad political circles raged at their own exclusion and at the many illegalities alleged; hostile posters and pamphlets appeared on walls and in coffee-shops. All administrative shortcomings were once again, and unreasonably, attributed to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet itself was unhappy, Madfa'i and 'Umari were felt to be doubtfully loyal, Yusif Ghanima a political nonentity. Far more sinister, however, was the stream of subversive propaganda which poured insistently from the capital, inciting tribesmen to emotions bound to end in anti-Government violence. It was understood to emanate from a group of opposition statesmen, bitter in their frustration and led by Ḥikmat Sulayman. The propaganda was addressed to potentially malcontent Kurds in the far north, and more regularly to the Najf-dominated tribes of the Euphrates, where such shaykhly politicians as 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr of the Fatla had been unwisely excluded from Parliament and had everything, private and public, to hope from a change of Government. With 'Abd al-Waḥid were men of similar stamp, Sayid Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh, 'Alwan al-Yasiri, and others. Simultaneously, and by reaction against the claim of these to leadership, another half of the tribal world, not less unquiet and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

not less hot for 'Shi'i rights', sought the favours of the present Ministry. Without, for the moment, overt violence a dangerous mood was gaining possession of the tribes of Diwaniya liwā and spreading to Ḥilla. It was shown by excited meetings, tribal war-dances, the flourishing of arms. Appeals reached the Najf 'Ulamā, notably Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Kashif al-Ghaṭā, the leading Arab Mujtahid, for unifying support. Telegrams were dispatched to the King, a monster petition organized, and finally in January 1935 an audience with him was obtained. These moves produced no result. 'Ali Jawdat laboured to restore order by persuasion, by censorship, by prohibition of meetings and suppression of newspapers; but such measures and the distractions provided by the ceremonial opening at Kirkuk of the Mediterranean pipeline, by disastrous spring floods, by the funeral of King 'Ali, and by crises in the negotiations with Persia were all in vain. The ineffective Ministry resigned on 23 February 1935.

To replace it, the King's advisers recommended the formation of an Ikhā Ministry, without further elections and without the inclusion of Yasin Pasha or Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani, whose intrigues it was believed had largely created the present near-anarchy. But the Ikhā having refused these conditions, no alternative appeared to the formation of another Madfa'i Ministry. Formed on 4 March, it contained respected personalities—Nuri Sa'id, 'Abd al-'Aziz Qaṣṣab, Amin Zaki, Ghanima, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, Rashid al-Khawja—but had no substantial advantage over its predecessors. It commanded little royal or popular support, and could work neither by inspired diplomacy nor ruthless firmness. Jamil al-Madfa'i hoped for the pacification of the Euphrates by 'legal' means, sent ministers to tour the distracted area, tried vainly to persuade the senators to resume their duties, and appealed to the Opposition and the press for 'unity'. When the tribal position had further deteriorated, with actual insurgence in the Daghara and the Fayṣaliya areas of Diwaniya and among the 'Azza north of Baghdad, he sent troops to the Euphrates districts; but these were too few, ineffectively directed, and thereby merely provocative. The tribal political leaders and their mentor Kashif al-Ghaṭā—sadly embarrassed by rival claims to his support and glad to take refuge in pious platitudes—produced in the end a not immoderate statement of Shi'i claims, bearing scores of personal seals. Organization of the counter-faction among the Euphrates shaykhs was attempted, but could do little in immediate relief. Stronger military steps were deprecated in favour of a 'political solution' by the Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, nor would the King permit them. After a mere thirteen days of office the unhappy Madfa'i Ministry resigned.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

[1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

645 lucrative trusteeship of the Qadiri Awqaf. The Shi'i Minister of
648 Education, Ridhā al-Shabibi, resigned in September 1935 and was replaced by a Shi'i of different type, the lawyer Ṣādiq al-Baṣṣam. Relations with the other Arab States were notably extended by a Treaty with Sa'udi Arabia, exchanges of princely and ministerial visits, and missions received from Syria, the Yaman, and Egypt; and 'Iraqi statesmen, particularly Nuri Sa'id, responding to strong public opinion, took in 1936 jointly with Ibn Sa'ud a leading part in intervening in the long-drawn Palestine Arab strike. Nevertheless, critics in Baghdad were not wanting who called for stronger anti-Zionist action than the telegrams, deputations, and appeals of the Hashimi Ministry; and they recalled that Yasin Pasha in opposition, in 1932 and since, had led an anti-Treaty and anti-British policy very different from his present complacence.

645 Other gestures of Opposition politicians, embittered by long
665 exclusion from office, were those of horror at the brutality of the Euphrates tribal suppressions, and disapproval of the recurring
[661] use of the Army for police measures. They pointed at the private fortunes which, mysteriously, certain ministers were said to be amassing; and they execrated the alleged spy system which was one of the ministerial means of control, and the suppression of newspapers inclined to criticize them. From the left-wing Ahali group a particular dissatisfaction arose. They saw, under Yasin Pasha, no hope of carrying out the reforms which they advocated. Shedding an extremist and in certain cases Communist or near-Communist minority, the group grew with the adhesion of other unemployed politicians. Though never formed as a party, they stood for social reform and land reform on lines which, while excluding class warfare, must yet include some measure of redistribution of wealth, some improvement in the conditions of the working class, and some trespass on feudal and plutocratic privilege. Prominent in the movement were Ja'far abu al-Timman, Kamil al-Chadirchi (a young half-brother of Ra'uf), Yusif 'Izz al-Din a financial expert of Kurdish descent, and a half-dozen of English- or American-educated intellectuals. Government lack of sympathy with their efforts, and the arrest of their less discreet members, led them finally to oppose the régime with a bitterness which would accept allies from any source.

665 No statesman felt more impatiently his exclusion from power
668 than Ḥikmat Sulayman. Of excellent ability and generally popular, he assessed shrewdly the strength of the various anti-Hashimi forces, and admired the authoritarian structure of Turkish politics, which country he revisited in 1935. In Baghdad he was allied with the left wing, and resentful at newspaper suppressions which affected him personally; and he placed himself increasingly in con-

lr Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

tact with leaders of the Army. The latter, its morale uplifted by triumphs over Assyrian villagers and Euphrates tribesmen, was asking whether to serve the intrigues and ambitions of the Baghdad politicians was, after all, the ideal: whether direct dominance of the State by its armed force, as in Turkey or Persia, would not be more congenial? The stages by which Ḥikmat Sulayman and the forceful sinister Bakr Ṣidqi came into closer agreement, and the latter abandoned his loyalty to Yasin Pasha and his brother Ṭaha, cannot now be traced. To Ḥikmat the immediate desideratum was a change of Government in his own favour, and only the Army could produce this; Bakr Ṣidqi's ambition was to effect a stroke which would assure the Army of a paramount position and himself the headship of the Army. Neither at any time sought, it seems, a personal or formal dictatorship.

In October 1936 Ṭaha left 'Iraq to visit Turkey, leaving Ṣidqi, then commanding the 1st Division, to act in his place. The autumn manœuvres on the middle Diyalā gave occasion to concentrate almost all of the armed forces outside the capital. The plot concerted by Bakr with Ḥikmat Sulayman was communicated to a few officers at Qaraghan, notably 'Abd al-Laṭif Nuri, the general commanding the 2nd Division. The two generals drafted a letter to the King, demanding the formation of a new Ministry under Ḥikmat, and handed it to the latter. Leaders of the left-wing group were admitted to the secret. The Air Force under its Commander, Muḥammad 'Ali Juwad, a close friend of Ṣidqi, was concentrated at Qaraghan and was provided with leaflets to scatter over Baghdad at the appropriate moment. On the night of 28 October the Army, renamed the National Defence Force for the occasion, began its 'march on Baghdad'.

By early morning of the 29th leaflets rained from the sky over Baghdad, and Ḥikmat conveyed the agreed letter to the palace. Yasin Pasha and his colleagues, amazed at a turn of events wholly unexpected, made their way to the King's ante-room, where Ghazi had already summoned the British Ambassador. The latter advised His Majesty to consult his Cabinet, to ascertain the intentions of Ḥikmat, and to proceed, above all, constitutionally. The ministers, now joined by all their colleagues except Rashid 'Ali, were ready to resign. Bombs fell on Baghdad in the mid-morning, a three-hour time limit for the Cabinet's surrender having expired, and some civilians killed and wounded showed the zeal of the Royal 'Iraqi Air Force. After a discussion which could end but one way, the Cabinet resigned, and a Royal Irada appointed Ḥikmat Sulayman to form a new Ministry.

One shocking incident distressed the public, horrified the British Ambassador, and disgusted Ḥikmat himself—the brutal murder of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the contrary, it was criticized by anti-Zionist enthusiasts, by ardent members of the pan-Arab Muthannā Club in Baghdad, and at times in Egypt and Syrian newspapers, as being less than whole-hearted on the question of Arab unity. Bakr Ṣidqi was a Kurd, Ḥikmat Sulayman by sympathy more Turk than Arab, and the Ahali group cared little for international politics. The tone of its early programme and of the speeches of Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman were equalitarian and easily labelled Communistic, and they alarmed the established classes. The Reformist group had indeed assumed its share of power with high hopes; but for all their newspaper and their 'People's Reform League', to which four ministers belonged, they found little popular support. They were opposed by the shaykhs who feared for their own positions, and thwarted by the Army who distrusted or despised them. The efforts of the group, laudable as they were as appreciating something of the real weaknesses and evils of 'Iraq society, were politically unprofitable to a Ministry dominated by the Army and by reaction. The freedom of the press and of politics promised for all, in contrast to Yasin's régime, ceased to be permitted as soon as opponents grew active. Political and tribal prisoners including the Yazidis were released and a general amnesty proclaimed; but not long afterwards measures of suppression were taken as severe as those of a year earlier. Meanwhile friends of Ja'far Pasha—and notably his brother-in-law, Nuri Sa'id, tirelessly manœuvring and writing from Egypt and Syria—would forgive neither the murder nor its perpetrators, nor the willingness of the King and the present Cabinet to leave it unpunished. And, with all these elements of criticism and discontent, those endemic on the middle Euphrates were still alive, and soon to burst into violent activity.

Nowhere indeed were the embarrassments of Ḥikmat's position clearer than in his attempts to solve the insoluble Euphrates problem. He must placate malcontents without offending their enemies: he must pardon the already condemned, but not show weakness: must keep order, but without a harshness which would be resented. Starting with all confidence in his own good intentions and diplomatic skill, he signally failed. The ferment of self-seeking and vengeful faction which was the normal life of Euphrates shaykhly and religious circles refused to cool at his bidding. A notorious land dispute among the Bani Zurayj of Samawa qadhā was the occasion to rally once again the forces supporting and opposed to 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr and Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh. These flouted the orders of the Ministry to a point which made inevitable a return to the severity with which Ḥikmat Sulayman had hoped to dispense, the two inveterate trouble-makers were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, arrested, and sentenced to detention in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

northern 'Iraq. In June 1937 continued lawlessness at Samawa led to military operations on the habitual pattern, with destruction of villages, tribal attacks on the qadhā town, and (it was said) the shooting of hostages by the Army. Deep as was the impression made on the tribes by this treatment, peace never returned to these troubled regions during the life-time of the Sulaymani Ministry. In the towns, security was reasonably maintained, and isolated acts of anti-Jewish violence which had occurred in Baghdad in 1936 were not repeated.

The Ministry remained unhappy in the political sphere. The general elections ordered in November 1936 and completed in February 1937 produced a Chamber from which indispensable compliance with Ṣidqi's wishes had excluded the bulk of former Deputies and all but twelve of the Reformists; but had admitted, as a conciliatory favour, some ill-chosen wildlings from the Euphrates tribes. In the four months of the Extraordinary Session from February to June 1937 the Chamber was uneasy and divided, with painful friction between the Ministry's own ill-assorted followers. This, and the frustrations of their minority position, and their dislike of the re-adopted harsh policy at Samawa, led in June to the resignation of the four Reformist ministers. While still in office their influence, especially that of Chadirchi, had inspired, perhaps encouraged, serious strikes among industrial workers. So were explained the successive strikes at the Kut barrage, in the drilling-areas of the B.O.D. Company, in the Railway workshops, among the Port workers and the Najf weavers, and among the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk. These strikes, whether industrially justified or not, reflected a new spirit of labour self-consciousness not necessarily unhealthy—and a new political weapon.

Ḥikmat's hopes of strengthening his Cabinet by the inclusion in it of leading statesmen—Nuri Sa'id himself, or Jamil al-Madfa'i—could not but fail since few now trusted Bakr or the uneasy regime itself. Of the four new ministers, two, 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, were Sunni lawyer-politicians and functionaries, and two, 'Abbas Mahdi and Ja'far Ḥamandi, were Shi'is of similar background. They were posted to the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Works, and Education respectively; but they were politically of little weight. The breach between the Reform movement and the Government was now complete; the People's Reform League was suppressed, and prominent Communists, real or alleged, were arrested. Two of the most active, 'Abd al-Qadir and Yusif, sons of Isma'il, fled to Paris. The Army dominated, ever more obviously, the Prime Minister and his Government.

The position was one which Bakr Ṣidqi could not but abuse. He

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646 The new Parliament assembled on 23 December. Its members,
665 selected with the greatest care, did not include Ḥikmat Sulayman or, save one, any of his Cabinet. Nevertheless, the session was a stormy one. Partisans of Ja'far Pasha returned hotly but always in vain to the attack; their final demand for a judicial inquiry was refused as being incompatible with the Act of Indemnity for all the 1937 offenders or suspects, which was passed by Parliament in March. The ill-feeling between Nuri Sa'id and Ḥikmat, not in itself unfavourable to the stability of the Madfa'i Ministry, was interrupted only by Nuri's long absences from the country; his visits to 'Iraq were treated as danger signals. The ejected ministers of the Hashimi Cabinet waged constant war in Parliament with the beneficiaries of the Bakr Ṣidqi régime, with mutual accusations of intrigue or treason; nothing, after all, had changed in the politics of Baghdad! Parliament adjourned on 7 May. Sir Maurice Peterson had replaced Sir A. Clark Kerr as British Ambassador two months earlier.

000 Politics apart, the year 1938 was one of exceptional tranquillity. All was quiet in Kurdistan, bandits were arrested or dispersed in Bazyan, the Sulaymaniya countryside was untroubled. Shaykh Maḥmud's properties, confiscated in 1931, were restored to him. A normal qadhā administration was introduced for the first time into the Pishdar area. The murder of an American missionary, Mr. Cumberland, by Doshki tribesmen in Dohuk qadhā was an isolated crime. The signs of mourning in Kirkuk at the death of
[668] Kamal Ataturk could be ignored as harmless. The arrest and trial of Communists in Baghdad was approved by all; Parliament legislated to declare Communism in 'Iraq illegal and its votaries dangerous criminals; the movement was forced underground. No strikes interrupted industrial work or the public services. The middle Euphrates remained precariously quiet. An outbreak of fighting between two 'Amara tribes was composed, after serious bloodshed, by a Muntafiq arbitrator. In the western desert, traditional Shammar-'Uqaydat hostilities dragged on.

701 Efforts were made to obtain arms for the 'Iraq Army on sounder lines than those of Bakr Ṣidqi. Discipline improved, Kurd-Arab bickering in the forces was reduced, and the old Royal Air Force quarters at Hinaydi—known henceforward as al-Rashid Camp—were occupied by the 'Iraq Army. The R.A.F. completed its move to Ḥabbaniya, where a cantonment with modern amenities had been erected.

563 The Assyrian question moved towards a solution—or a confession of insolubility. The Khabur settlements were, in part at 'Iraqi expense, made self-supporting under the League Committee's arrangements, and after 1938 the 'Iraq Treasury was relieved

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest against the Baṣra concession, others—Rashid 'Ali and Ḥikmat Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an outbreak of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number of their more violent opponents. These included officers known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Ali led to his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri, and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms, occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement. Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained, Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties, and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

19,000 in 1945, largely by the addition of nearly 5,000 men to the Mobile Force. In the Social services the tendency was still towards such limited development and improvement of the personnel as was feasible, though budget allotments to Education were reduced to a third, and those of the Health service to a quarter, of the funds made available for Defence.

The release of the remaining 'Amara internees in mid-1944 and at intervals in 1945 made its contribution to the resurgent political activity of the time. The fourth member of the Golden Square, Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, was handed over by the Turks and hanged in September 1945. Naji Shawkat, captured in Italy, was brought to Baghdad and began to serve his sentence; Rashid 'Āli, refused entrance into Switzerland, contrived to reach Sa'udi Arabia by way of Lebanon and there, sheltered by the traditional Arab attitude to guests seeking sanctuary, could defy demands for extradition. The activity of the Baghdad press and the multiplication of its daily sheets from five to fourteen was both effect and partial cause of the reanimation of the political scene which had well begun before 8 May 1945, the date of the armistice with Germany. The old-fashioned catch-words of 'imperialism', 'the foreigner', and 'complete independence' reappeared in a thousand bitter leading articles, the situation in Palestine and Syria gave congenial topics, and the economic frustrations of the time—and indeed all of the nation's backwardness and inequalities—were, it appeared, the fault of nothing but the sinister machinations of the British. The demand for the re-formation of political parties was heard on every side, and with it the removal of all restrictions and the early revision of the Treaty with Great Britain as being no longer compatible with 'Iraq's present status.

Communism, never extinguished in Baghdad even when outlawed in 1938, gained ground perceptibly in the later war years. Communists had supported Rashid 'Āli in 1941, but on the Nazi invasion of Russia had temporarily abandoned the anti-British for the Allied cause, and remained in the cities as a living though mainly clandestine force. One such organization was the League of 'Iraqi Communists which, catering for an educated membership, followed the lawyer Da'ud al-Ṣayigh; another, the 'Iraqi Communist Party under the Christian 'Comrade Fahad' (the Panther), alias Yusif Salman, produced the secretly-printed *al-Qa'ida* newspaper. The movement gained adherents in Kurdistan, where the proximity of the Russians in north-west Persia attracted the hopeful interest of anti-Arab nationalist students and of Aghās now learning to despair of British intervention on their behalf. It spread in Baghdad and the chief cities among the poor and thwarted (not least among the Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish minorities),

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 eager for any ally who would help to overthrow a régime which seemed to bring them only poverty and hopelessness; and many who had acclaimed such an ally in Nazi Germany now looked instead to Soviet Russia. This Communism of the 'Iraq of 1944–5 had little intellectual background, although it attracted the intelligentsia, and showed scarcely a link with the doctrine, or even with the agents, of Moscow. It was organized by secret meetings, leaflets, the still untraced news-sheet of Comrade Fahad, and busy talkers among the railway and oil company workers. The application of Kamil al-Chadirchi and his friends in April 1944 for permission to form a People's Party was refused by Nuri Pasha; they addressed their protest significantly to the Russian Consul at
668 Kirmanshah. The opening of official 'Iraqi-Russian relations in
648× September of that year was as welcome to the local Communists and Reformists as it was alarming to the conservatives. M. Krikori Titovitch Zaitzev, an inoffensive personality, was appointed first Russian Minister in Baghdad in November, and came into residence early in 1945; the first 'Iraq Minister to Moscow, 'Abbas Mahdi, assumed his post late in that year. At the same period the Communist Party ventured with new confidence to address the Prime Minister—with copies to many authorities outside 'Iraq—demanding the 'abolition of all reactionary laws' and pardon for all imprisoned Communists and Kurdish rebels.

648× Emerging from the war undamaged and enriched, 'Iraq could look to play in international affairs a much more confident part than in the 'thirties, and would expect the treatment due to a State with all the appearance of present stability and hopeful promise. From the French its Foreign Ministry was estranged by 'the events' of Syria and the Lebanon; a mission from the French Committee of National Liberation was coldly received, and no French representative was now found in Baghdad. The United States, whose interest in future markets and civil airports was undisguised, still occupied but a small place in the 'Iraqi purview, and one for the moment discredited by the American attitude to Zionism. Nevertheless, their future part in Middle Eastern affairs was already foreshadowed, and the invitation of President Roosevelt to the Regent to visit America was welcomed. Delayed by the President's death, the Amir, accompanied by Nuri Pasha and Da'ud al-Haydari, and leaving his uncle the Amir Zayd as Regent, arrived in America in the midsummer of 1945 as the guest of President Truman. He toured the country, visited the Governor-General of Canada, and concluded a successful journey by visits to London, Paris, Rome, Istanbul, Ankara, and Beirut.

The nation's participation, as of right, in the important international conferences of the period tended to widen the views of at

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

5. KURDISH ALARMS

563 668 During the bad days of 1941 and throughout 1942 the Kurds did nothing to add to the anxieties of Government, though close observers were aware of the lack of loyalty, sometimes of scornful dislike, still felt towards Baghdad in the Kurdish mountains. Since nothing would induce them to forget their un-Arab distinctness and racial pride, the preservation of peaceful administration would depend, it seemed, on minimizing friction, on ensuring for the Kurds a maximum of sympathetic discrimination, and on the power to strike effectively at need. Nothing occurred to simplify dealing with this greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, and the near presence of a disturbing influence in north-west Persia was to prove an added embarrassment.

Shaykh Maḥmud, whose foolish movement of defiance continued even after the restoration of the lawful Regent and constitutional government, had been allowed to live in one of his own villages. In Persian Kurdistan the Anglo-Russian invasion of Persia in that year led to collapse of the central authority; and the vacuum of power was soon filled by the self-appointment of Kurdish chiefs to local rule, with the enforced acquiescence of Teheran. Among many old unwanted trouble-makers who returned from exile was Ḥama Rashid Khan, an 'Iraqi by birth but now claiming dual nationality; he achieved a brief independence at Saqiz until 1942 when he was driven out, re-crossed to 'Iraq, and submitted to detention at Kirkuk. Approaches from Persian Kurdish leaders to the British Embassy in Baghdad for inclusion in a 'British Zone' were (as so often before) refused, to the bewilderment of the chieftains, who found incomprehensible the British support of Persian or 'Iraqi Governments; but after some months the endless squabbles among the Aghās enabled Persian troops to re-enter most of the towns, assert some sort of authority, and drive a number of leaders into 'Iraq. Mahabad (Ṣawj Bulaq) alone the Persians failed to enter, and it became the centre of an all-Kurdish enclave. A vigorous Kurdish society, the Jiyana Kurd or Kurdish Resurrection (called also simply the Komalla Kurd), was formed in Mahabad, and its publication, the *Nishtman* (Homeland) magazine, reached 'Iraq. Similar clubs were founded in the northern liwās, and the Kurdish intelligentsia had formed a Hewa (Hope) Society, later to be joined or superseded by a Rezgari (Rescue) Group, insistent on 'national rights' against all oppressors.

No overt trouble, however, arose for a time, and the Barzani leaders, Shaykh Aḥmad and his younger brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, who were living on allowances away from their homes, gave no offence until the midsummer of 1943. In that month Mullā

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Muṣṭafā, always unbalanced and now inflamed by new grievances at the cost of living, escaped from Sulaymaniya, regained Barzan, and raised a force to join that of a Turkish-Kurdish outlaw, Sa'id Birokhi. The latter was captured by a Turkish column, but the Mullā, waxing in strength, successfully attacked Government posts and carried out profitable raids. A message from Nuri Pasha, conveyed through the still detained Shaykh Aḥmad, urged him to surrender. He refused, flouted all authority, and tampered with the loyalty of Kurdish officers of the Army. A column of the latter, accompanied by the Chief of Staff, left Margasur to deal with the rebels, but poor leadership and many desertions led to ignominious failure, and a column of Indian troops occupied Diyana as a precaution against further loss. The Government, forced now to prefer negotiations to force, offered Mullā Muṣṭafā the chance to cross into Persia, or to live with the Pishdar; he declined both offers, again demanded 'Kurdish rights', and was warned by the British Ambassador (to whom as usual he appealed) that British support would be given not to him but to the Government he was offending.

A visit in January 1944 by the Kurdish Minister without portfolio, Mājid Muṣṭafā, was successful in restoring some sort of relations, and the Mullā was claimed in Baghdad communiqués to have 'submitted unconditionally to the Regent'. Thereafter, Mājid Muṣṭafā toured the Kurdish area, removed unpopular officials, arranged for a distribution of barley, and installed an able Kurdish General and graduate of the British Staff College, Baha al-Din Nuri, as Mutaṣarrif of Sulaymaniya.

But a policy of sympathy in the Kurdish liwās, supported generally by the Premier, was opposed by some of his colleagues; the undertakings given to the Mullā were likely to be lost in delays and evasions, and the Barzani leader in his frustration again demanded British intervention. The last ministerial tour of Nuri Pasha, in May 1944, was to Kurdistan, where threats of renewed trouble were now persistent and Kurdish-Arab feeling ran high in the Army. He proposed the establishment of an all-Kurdish liwā formed from the Kurdish qadhās of Mosul, and the appointment of officials to it by the Kurdish representative minister in the Cabinet; he added the offer of a Deputy Director-General in the Ministry of Education, the improvement of social services in the north, the grant of agricultural loans, and reconsideration of the unpopular tobacco monopoly. But his Cabinet colleagues refused to support him, the plan for the liwā of Dohuk was unacceptable to the Regent, and the Sa'idi Ministry fell amid doubt and disunity. The anti-Kurdish feeling in much of the Baghdad political world had again prevailed: it was based, as ever, on the fear of separatism,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 668 on the certainty that indulgence in the north would be followed by equal or greater Shi'i demands, and on the crudely selfish ambitions of the Kurdish leaders. The Kurds were, moreover, represented in the Cabinet only by individuals long denationalized, and in the Chamber by deputies selected for their tractability.

The Pachachi Ministry did little to honour the undertakings of Nuri Pasha, though the Prime Minister and Arshad approved them against the opposition of Muṣṭafā al-'Umari and Taḥsin 'Ali. Baha al-Din was removed from Sulaymaniya; but after a meeting of Kurdish leaders there in July 1944, the Cabinet sent up two Kurdish Mutaṣarrifs to take charge of that liwā and Arbil, and dispatched the Minister of Economics, Tawfiq Wahbi, on a goodwill mission in Kurdistan. He was forced to realize the extent of ill will towards Baghdad, and found that Barzani power had redoubled by a recent marriage alliance with Zibar. On the Minister's departure Mullā Muṣṭafā helped himself to Government grain stores, looted police posts, conducted a futile correspondence with the Mutaṣarrif of Mosul, and demanded from Baghdad the fulfilment of Nuri Pasha's promises—and a loan for himself. In November, four 'Iraqis were dropped in Mosul liwā by parachute from a German plane; two were captured, two escaped. The year closed with uneasiness at the likely prospect of another Kurdish campaign, this time in midwinter: a blow which the Government attempted to forestall by free distributions of grain and cloth.

These fears proved in part groundless. Peace was outwardly undisturbed throughout the winter of 1944–5, though Kurdish restless dissatisfaction and the increase of Russian influence precluded confidence. A connexion between Kurdish nationalism—of the type favoured by the intelligentsia rather than that of the feudal leaders—and some type of Communism became more evident; two Kurdish-language Communist magazines, later combined into one (the *Azadi*, or Freedom), appeared in 'Iraq in 1934 produced, like *al-Qa'ida*, by the Communist Party; and some of the organizers, who included Army officers, were no doubt in touch with the Russians. The forms taken by both nationalism and Communism were various; *Azadi* was purely Communist and advocated a united front with the Arabs against reaction and feudalism, while the Persian or Adharbayjani *Nishtman* spoke for exclusive Kurdish unity and rights, and bade the feudal leaders modernize themselves.

563 669 In March 1945 an Amnesty Bill was placed before Parliament, and passed with the reluctance of many deputies; it pardoned all Kurdish offenders up to February 1944, the date of the Mullā's submission. He himself visited Mosul, and was received there by

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

X

END OF THE HALF-CENTURY

I. GATHERING STORM

THE resignation of the Pachachi Government was followed by a month of uneasiness while the choice of a successor Cabinet was delayed. Despite the alleged misgivings of the Regent, the premiership fell on 23 February 1946 to Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, a statesman whose many gifts did not include that of creating confidence. He retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, brought the able and vigorous 'Ali Mumtaz to Works, General Isma'il Namiq to Defence, 'Umar Nadhmi to Justice, and Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban to Social Affairs. To the three all-important Ministries of Interior, Finance, and Supply he appointed respectively Sa'd Ṣaliḥ, a Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif hostile to Ṣaliḥ Jabr: 'Abd al-Wahhab Maḥmud, a Baṣra lawyer with a stormy political past: and another Shi'i, 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Chalabi, of American education and unusual ability. Two more newcomers assumed duty at the Ministries of Economics and Education: 'Abd al-Hadi al-Dhahir—a third Shi'i and ex-official—and Najib al-Rawi. The composition of this Cabinet was modified in April by the substitution of Dr. Shawkat al-Zahawi, a Kurdish pathologist, for Baban at Social Affairs; and, in the last days of its short life, by the move of 'Ali Mumtaz to Foreign Affairs and Chalabi to Works.

Inspired by liberal views, the Ministry started with fair hopes. Although, surprisingly, no budget for 1946–7 was submitted, the State finances were still treated as giving no cause for immediate alarm. The 'hard currency' agreement made with the British in 1945 was renewed for a year, and a British trade mission under Lord Davidson was welcomed in Baghdad. The new Electoral Law long under preparation was passed; substantially improving and liberalizing the existing procedures, it provided for the giving of due notice and publicity to forthcoming elections and to the candidates who offered themselves, and for the fragmentation of liwās into constituencies which would produce 138 instead of 115 deputies. It did not, however, introduce direct one-stage election, for which the Opposition parties combined to press as likely to be 'freer'. The Liwā Administration Law, passed in February, gave promise of greater zeal and initiative in local government, and of independent action in case of disorder.

Countryside security was well maintained. Winter passed into spring without the appearance of the expected trouble in Kurdistan,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1948) MH1 Iraq MH1

though streams of unwelcome propaganda were flowing in from the Republic of Mahabad (with Marshal Muṣṭafā high in its councils), Army units were stationed in readiness in frontier qadhās, and a memorandum of Kurdish appeal and protest had been handed to the Anglo-American Palestine Committee. An Army column visited Sinjar, but only minor clashes resulted. The air of dissatisfaction or menace which hung over the Holy Cities led to no overt trouble. Elsewhere in the towns, efforts made by the progressive or malicious to create labour unrest were successful in inspiring a railway strike in March, and a political general strike and demonstration was organized in May in protest against the Anglo-American report. It led to no breach of the peace; indeed the deputies themselves had cabled in February a protest to London against continued Jewish immigration into Palestine, and Fadhil Jamali had testified similarly to the Anglo-American Commission in Cairo. The Cabinet and the Regent sent further protests in May to the British Government, King George VI, and the American President.

That political demonstrations were now possible was owed to the Suwaydi (or the Regent's) policy of removing restrictions and permitting the rebirth of parties. The 'Amara concentration camp was closed; martial law, imposed in Baghdad and neighbouring districts in 1941, was at last removed; the Public Security Ordinance of 1940 was revoked, and press censorship abolished. This liberality was repaid by journalist ex-internees in the form of savage attacks on the Suwaydi Ministry, attacks reflecting both personal bitterness and the militant attitudes of the parties which plunged forthwith into full activity. If they were representative as ever rather of the dissatisfied and power-seeking than the satisfied and power-holding political and social groups, this was least true of the Liberal Party which, dormant since its foundation in 1939, now revived with a modest reform programme made attractive by an anti-British colouring; its members, not numerous, included Kamil al-Khudhayri, President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, and Sa'd Ṣaliḥ. It published the *Ṣawt al-Aḥrar* as its daily newspaper. The Independence Party, based on the old côterie of Rashid 'Āli and Yasin Pasha, brought up to date by accretions of students and malcontent intelligentsia, passed for right-wing nationalist and was guided by the Muthannā Club founder-member and Nazi sympathizer, Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba, and by the bitter xenophobes Fa'iq al-Samarrā'i and Ṣādiq Shanshal. The party, well organized and comparatively stable, based its foreign policy on unfriendliness to Turkey and to Great Britain but 'neutrality' towards Russia, with an anti-Hashimite and pro-Mufti leaning, and aspirations at home towards social reform; the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 668 *Liwā al-Istiqlal* was its press organ. Dr. Sami Shawkat's National Revival Party, with its paper *al-Iṣlaḥ*, was similar but less stable in its views, and even more violent in tone. The last of the left-wing parties was the National Democratic of Kamil al-Chadirchi, an ineffective leader but veteran left-wing champion, with Muḥammad Ḥadid, London-educated left-wing socialist of good standing, and Ḥusayn Jamil, an ex-judge of good family and reformist views; its newspaper was the *Ṣawt al-Ahali*, later *Ṣadā al-Ahali*. A party of social reform deriving from the old Ahali group of 1934, it drew its support largely from wealthy townsmen and young enthusiasts and directed its fire principally against the Western Powers and against the 'old gang' in ruling circles. Its official anti-Communist attitude did not preclude some approval of Russian policies, nor its national loyalties an anti-Hashimite bias. The party of National Union, which was dissolved in 1947, was on the borderline of Communism, and its paper *al-Siyasa* frankly subversive; its stalwarts were the American-educated printing-press proprietor, 'Abd al-Fattaḥ Ibrahim, and Nadhim al-Zahawi. In the same category fell the People's Party of the Communist 'Aziz Sharif, with its papers *al-Sha'b* and later *al-Waṭn*, suppressed in 1946 and 1947 respectively. The two parties last named amalgamated before their suppression into a Party of National Union. The avowedly Communist party of National Liberation under Muḥammad al-Shabibi and a group of Jewish Communists was refused the right to legalize itself but remained, with other groups of Yusif Salman and Da'ud al-Ṣayigh, fully active underground. Their members were drawn from industrial workers, from rich young men hiding behind ministers, and in general from the discontented or visionary of all classes. Their organization was widespread and efficient; it included cells in Government offices—though officials were forbidden by law to participate openly in politics—and in industrial enterprises. Sulaymaniya was their principal centre, where contact was easy with the trans-frontier Communists and the merging of Communism with Kurdish nationalism was an effective device.

648 Relations with 'Iraq's northern neighbour, always cordial with reservations, were amicably restated by a mission of Nuri Sa'id to Ankara in February 1946. He initialed a draft treaty of friendship which confirmed the 1926 boundary, provided a mutual policy of brotherhood, non-interference, and free consultation, and looked forward to joint handling of such shared problems as the Kurds and the Euphrates waters. The ratification of this in Baghdad in June 1947 was to prove no matter of course; some deputies remembered the old grievance of Alexandretta, others felt that to draw closer to Ankara must be disloyal to Arab interests, or that an

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'Iraqi-Turkish bloc would be—worst of all crimes—acceptable to Great Britain. Nevertheless it was ratified, and a State visit by the Turkish President was anticipated. Some urged revival of the Sa'dabad Pact, others disliked it as un-Arab. The Treaty of Brotherhood with the Jordan Kingdom was duly approved, amid the black looks and street demonstrations of the anti-Hashimite factions.

The early fall of the Suwaydi Ministry, due to opposition in the Chamber and Senate and lack of Palace support, occurred on 3 May. In spite of popular hopes for a neutral or all-party Government, perhaps under the Amir Zayd, to hold elections and consolidate the structure of Government, it was followed on 1 June by a Ministry of indifferent quality led by the forceful authoritarian Arshad al-'Umari. He was to remain in office for six months, with a marked personal domination of his colleagues and of all departments, and to deal characteristically with the political freedoms permitted by his predecessor. He named 'Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab to Interior, Yusif Ghanima to Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba to Justice. The other ministers were all newcomers to Cabinet position: the Shi'i 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi (son of old 'Abd al-Ḥusayn) at Works, Babā 'Ali, the modernized and Americanized son of Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji, at Economics, Sa'id Ḥaqqi, another Kurd, at Defence, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, Dr. 'Abd al-Hadi al-Pachachi—cousin of Ḥamdi and Muzaḥim—at Social Affairs, and Nuri al-Qadhi, a lawyer and judge of the old school, at Education. In August Qaṣṣab resigned his portfolio, which the Prime Minister assumed, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh took that of Supplies.

In spite of Arshad's will to impose discipline and peace, his period of office was troubled. In the tribes an unusually bloody clash occurred in August between the Shammar and the Albu Muṭaywit, with the loss of 200 lives. Danger in Kurdistan seemed to diminish as the Russian attempt to consolidate its puppet Republics across the frontier failed, and disillusioned and starving Barzani families trickled homewards to be disarmed. Many of the rebels in Persian Kurdistan, including Qadhi Muḥammad, were hanged by their Government on re-entry; but Mullā Muṣṭafā refused all terms, escaped capture, and after failing to re-enter 'Iraq reached Soviet territory. The Government accepted the unconditional surrender of his brother Shaykh Aḥmad and of his son Shaykh 'Ubaydullah. Four Kurdish officers who had fought for the Mullā and a few other ex-ringleaders were sentenced to death, and the need to deal with the armed insurgence of Muḥammad Khalid, the son of Shaykh Aḥmad, forced Government to keep troops in the neighbourhood. In Sulaymaniya liwā hostilities

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan, where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to blame the Company itself.

In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some 3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question. In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker* was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps, which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry, approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan (at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the Panjwin earthquake victims.

In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status which Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946, and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views'; and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

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The People's Party and that of National Union were finally suppressed in October for preaching sedition and rebellion. It was notorious that the strike in the Port of Basra during the summer had been Communist-organized, an activity of the illegal but vigorous Party of National Liberation and the Anti-Zionist League.

But no preoccupation of the Government and public during 1947 equalled that of the absorbing and saddening Palestine Question. If its appeal was less to the northern areas and to Shi'i circles and those of the minorities, the problem of Arab survival in Palestine against the threat of rich, ubiquitous, and ably directed Zionism, backed by American money and competing political interest (and supported by strong elements in Britain), excelled all others in the eyes of more and wider elements than any other foreign issue could interest. It aroused sincere and bitter sentiment as showing, it was felt, the full picture of Western injustice and cynicism, and it united all parties in a dangerous atmosphere of anti-European emotion. The London Conference of the autumn of 1946 and early 1947, attended by Fadhil Jamali, reached no agreement except in rejecting the compromise 'Morrison Plan' which had succeeded to the inept unrealities of the Anglo-American Commission. Early in 1947 a Bevin Plan for Partition was equally rejected, and the Palestine problem was referred by Great Britain to the United Nations, whose Sub-Committee of Five toured Palestine during the summer. After an infinity of intrigues and pressures at Lake Success in the autumn of the year the General Assembly, warned of Great Britain's intention to withdraw from Palestine in the absence of an agreed settlement, took its decision in November to divide Palestine finally into Jewish and Arab areas; the Mandate was to end, British troops to withdraw, Arab and Jewish States to come into existence, and a special régime to be established for Jerusalem.

The passage of a year of general outward tranquillity in 'Iraq, a creditable body of legislation passed or submitted, and some sound measures carried out—one of which was the first serious Census—concealed at the time the true force of the factors of discontent and potential violence which were actually present and were gaining strength. When Parliament was opened on 1 December the poorer classes, already seriously short of bread, were approaching desperation. The country was empty of food stocks. Militant Communists were still active, and eager to use present discontents for their objective of anarchy. The small but zealous political parties—anti-traditionalist, anti-British and largely anti-Western, narrowly and unrealistically 'nationalist'—were less powerless in mob-rousing than the orthodox or the complacent

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

judged them; nor were they incapable of temporary union with each other or, in some eventualities, with the Communists. General disillusion created by the divided post-war world, the uneasy relations between East and West from China to Morocco, and the doubtful progress of 'democracy', had descended upon the conscious elements of the 'Iraq cities; and the destructive emotions it had produced were to find their readiest outlet in two fields: one, the Palestine situation now going from bad to worse: the other, the relations of 'Iraq with Great Britain now on the eve of restatement. All the latent menaces of 1947, a year of seeming progress and hope, were to be realized with tragic results in the year following.

2. PORTSMOUTH AND PALESTINE

During the weeks following the opening of Parliament on 1 December 1947 all was ready, it seemed, for the signature of a new Treaty; not only its principles but most of a new text had been agreed by the statesmen consulted in Baghdad and by the Regent. In the last days of the year it was announced that the Premier and his Foreign Minister—to be accompanied, in the event, by Nuri Sa'id and Shakir al-Wadi—would proceed to London for final talks and probable signature. Jamal Baban was left as acting Prime Minister. The Treaty was in fact agreed and initialed on 12 January 1948, and was signed at Portsmouth by the 'Iraqi deputation and Ernest Bevin on the 15th.

Praised by the latter as an inspiring example and precedent for other similar undertakings, the Treaty and its annex included the hope of co-operation in matters of technical and economic development; but primarily it was one of mutual defence. It provided for consultation in time of danger, and for immediate help, each to each, in time of war. The Air Force bases of Habbaniya and Shu'ayba were to be handed to 'Iraq, with the retention only of limited British personnel, at British expense but under 'Iraqi command, to ensure readiness for immediate use; British combatant forces could reoccupy them only in case of war. The British Military Mission was to disappear, a mixed Anglo-'Iraqi Council would undertake the development of strategic plans and offer recommendations on the equipment of the 'Iraqi forces. Standardization of equipment as between the two armies would be assured, help would be given by the R.A.F. to the R.I.A.F. in training abroad, arms of the latest pattern would be made available. The Treaty would come into force as soon as the post-war world had returned to peace conditions: as soon, that is, as all peace treaties with ex-enemy countries had come into force and occupying armies had been withdrawn.

The Treaty as published was welcomed in Great Britain, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

was judged satisfactory in Baghdad by the responsible elements which had already approved it, and by the Regent. The latter in an exchange of telegrams with King George VI held that the new Treaty was 'in the interests of both countries, and would consolidate their friendship'. The 'Iraqi delegation in Great Britain, passing a few days of holiday, felt no suspicion that their own countrymen would not accept an agreement which represented so obvious and advantageous an advance on the 1930 Treaty, and which seemed in no way calculated to offend national *amour propre*.

They were rapidly undeceived. The absence of the principal ministers from Baghdad, and their failure to explain and defend the new Treaty on or in advance of its publication, afforded a welcome opportunity for an attitude of emphatic 'patriotic' rejection to the parties and the town mob, who, directed by able organizers, had for weeks or months past been prepared for this event. The particular clauses of the new Treaty were little in question; nor was the upheaval more specifically anti-British than was necessary to afford a common rallying call, of proved efficacy, to diverse elements. If to some politicians and malcontents the continued British connexion and the presence even of British technicians was offensive, to far more the occasion was a suitable one to relieve their feelings of dismay at the now serious food shortage, the economic inequalities, an unpopular Prime Minister, an Administration with obvious shortcomings and much suspected corruption, and the resented exclusion from power of young politicians and publicists and of the old embittered adherents of Rashid 'Ali and his Generals.

The immediate reaction of the Baghdad public to the announcement of the Treaty was a three-day strike of Law and Engineering students, and the holding of demonstrations, impressive in their size and fervour, organized by the National Democratic, Independence, Liberal, and Communist Parties. Strikes were called in offices and workshops, and violent attacks made on the premises of British or suspected-British concerns, notably those of the *'Iraq Times*. Marches and countermarches, with ugly clashes with the police, filled the streets of the capital. Demonstrations, which early firmness might have controlled, were soon beyond discipline, the mob joined in with enthusiasm, and the communiqués of the Deputy Premier, Jamal Baban, and his now frightened ministers were unheeded. Police action in opening fire to restore a semblance of order was both unsuccessful and savagely resented. Not less than fifty persons were killed and between 100 and 200 injured, including many of the police. Mass movements which started on 16 January grew in scale on every succeeding day. The restoration of order must, it appeared, devolve on the Army, if on anyone; and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

it was found by ministers and perhaps by the Regent imprudent to invoke this force, whose attitude was incalculable and whose leadership was in parts rancorously Anglophobe. The morale of the police themselves, execrated by the mob and unsupported by their superiors, fell rapidly. In the provinces, farther from the inspirers of the trouble, the Mutaṣarrifs were usually able to control or at least to limit the organized street marches, and in most centres they preserved nearly normal conditions. In Sulaymaniya the demonstrators praised the Russians, detested all Arabs, abused the British, chased an English teacher from the town, and burnt the British Institute.

The Regent, against whom as a reputed Treaty advocate a part of the disorder was aimed—and indeed talk of a Republic was not lacking—convened a Crown Council on 21 January and, after five hours of discussion, felt the necessity of reversing his attitude and disclaiming the Treaty. He issued at its conclusion a statement that the Treaty was found to be unsatisfactory: that it did not 'realize the national aspirations of 'Iraq or consolidate the friendship between the two countries': and that he would ratify nothing that failed to secure for the country all its objectives. Notwithstanding this volte-face, the demonstrations continued unabated, with decreased police control and clear signs of the disintegration or disappearance of a part of the force. Public funerals attended by thousands were given to students who had fallen. The return of the Prime Minister to Baghdad, still convinced that all was the work of a few agitators and a misled public, availed nothing; his personal safety was with difficulty assured by a roof-top garrison at his private house. The press and crowd raged against him unchecked by police rifle-fire or by the arrest of Communist firebrands; and his public statement, still confident in tone, fell on deaf ears. The street riots and marches reached a climax on 27 January, with many deaths and injuries; a crowd demanded at the palace the resignation, or even the death, of the Prime Minister. Ṣalih Jabr was compelled to yield. He resigned office and fled for his life to his tribal home country on the Euphrates, and thence later to Jordan and to England. A hundred thousand people attended the funerals of 'the Martyrs' and the party spokesmen demanded the final abrogation of the Treaty. The days following showed little improvement in public order. Mass meetings in the streets continued and dominated the town with patriotic banners, threats of death to their enemies, the cry for free lands for all, and destruction to foreigners. Parties from the provinces, among them Kurds demanding the release of Barzani leaders, joined the crowds in the capital; business and social life were completely disrupted and the police largely disappeared from the streets. Throughout

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

these proceedings there was no hope of freedom for the expression, much less for the acceptance, of the opinions of the many who believed the Portsmouth Treaty to be a realistic and beneficent measure, of great advantage to the State.

On the disappearance of Ṣaliḥ Jabr the task of forming a Government was entrusted to the 66-year-old Shi'i nationalist, Sayid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr. Ignoring the claims of all save one of the party chiefs who had created the present troubles, he surrounded himself with tried statesmen of former Cabinets. With three Shi'i ministers—Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba at Supply, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam at Finance, and Riḍhā al-Shabibi at Education—he secured the services of Madfa'i (for a short time) at Interior, Arshad al-'Umari at Defence, Ḥamdi al-Pachachi (a sick man who died three months later) at Foreign Affairs, Muṣṭafā al-'Umari at Economics, 'Umar Nadhmi at Justice, Najib al-Rawi and Jalal Baban at Social Affairs and Works. Naṣrat al-Farsi, Mawlud al-Mukhliṣ, Ḥikmat Sulayman, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh had been expected to be members; the first-named with Da'ud al-Ḥaydari and for a few weeks the Amir of the Rabi'a, Muḥammad al-Sayhud, became ministers without portfolio. The team was strong in experience and personalities but, though supported by most of the parties, it lacked both cohesion and any policy save mere appeasement. After an early Cabinet meeting it announced that the Treaty would not be ratified; it was 'not a fit instrument for strengthening the ties with Great Britain'; but another Treaty might perhaps be considered. Parliament was prorogued for fifty days, and on 25 February the Chamber, pronounced unrepresentative and illegally elected, was dissolved and new elections were ordered. Sir Henry Mack succeeded Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird as British Ambassador in the same month.

The period during which the rolls of voters were completed and primary elections carried out was disturbed and unhappy, with erratic Government intervention which reflected individual ministers' predilections but no plan. The parties, unsure of success, already protested at 'Government interference', and two of them announced a boycott. Ministers vied with each other in disclaiming any part in opposing the rioters' violence during 'the revolution' on 20 January and appointed a committee to inquire into police action. Student parades and outcries continued, to the wearied disgust of quiet-loving citizens. Meetings, flag-wavings, and rifle-shooting in Sulaymaniya and other centres led again to violent clashes and disorder. The British Consulate at Kirkuk was attacked. The announcement that the British Military Mission was (in fact, at its own suggestion) to be withdrawn in May was hailed as a national triumph. The Anglo-Jordan Treaty on 29 March was another

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

theme for hostile schoolboy agitation in the streets of the capital. The Ministry's appeal for unity and tranquillity, and another by al-Ṣadr in person, were alike unheeded, and the work of administration, in which the Prime Minister had neither interest nor competence, was largely ignored. The near-famine conditions among the poorer classes could not be cured until after the harvest, which itself promised to be scanty; meanwhile an Australian grain ship was by British initiative diverted to Baṣra and its urgently needed stores distributed.

The death of Ḥamdi al-Pachachi on 27 March led to changes among the uneasy ministers. 'Umar Nadhmi had resigned and been replaced at Justice by Najib al-Rawi, who handed his portfolio of Social Affairs to Ḥaydari. Naṣrat had succeeded Madfa'i at Interior when the latter became President of the Senate, and was himself succeeded when he moved to Foreign Affairs by Muṣṭafā al-'Umari who could thus 'control' the forthcoming elections. The Amir al-Rabi'a resigned and went home in April. Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba left the Ministry early in June. The frequent absences of the Ministers of Finance and Justice at Arab League meetings led to constant interchange of ministerial duties, from which the shaken and demoralized Administration suffered.

The Chamber met on 26 June, after elections in which legal and illegal parties alike had put forth all their efforts, and which had produced street fighting in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniya. The Independence Party secured four seats, the National Democrats two, the Liberals one. All other deputies were free of party attachment and as such were likely to vote for any Ministry in power; it was clear that the enthusiasm, or the leadership, of the parties had still too little appeal to seduce the electorate from the familiar candidates of local importance in their constituencies or to resist the conservative influence of controlling officialdom. A Chamber—or an electorate—divided on true party lines was still an unrealizable conception.

The new Parliament was confronted, to its dismay, with a situation containing new and alarming features which events in Palestine had created. The United Nations decision for Partition, taken in November 1947, had led in 'Iraq as elsewhere to angry remonstrance, and in the Arab League to emergency meetings. But no hopeful measures could be taken or planned at these; the lines of cleavage within the League were already too clear, and most of the States members too doubtful of their own stability. The earlier decision to encourage the infiltration of guerrilla fighters from each country into Palestine, for the stiffening of local resistance, was carried out to a limited extent. Some hundreds—or, as some said, two battalions—of young and a few veteran

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the disturbing hostilities between civil and military authorities continued, and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

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The Regent, himself indefatigable in touring the country and visiting the Army and the Arab capitals, called upon Nuri Sa'id to form a new Ministry. He did so on the same day by retaining four of the outgoing ministers—Kubba at Justice, Rawi at Education, Jalal Baban at Works, Shakir at Defence—and by bringing Bahā al-Din Nuri to Social Affairs, Dhiya' Ja'far to Economics, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to Foreign Affairs. He retained Interior himself, and asked Jalal Baban to act temporarily in Finance until Khalil Isma'il reassumed the post.

Mainly through lack of mutual confidence between the Premier, some of the ministers, and the Throne, the ministerial history of 1949 was troubled in spite of improved leadership. The Cabinet, initially weak, was little strengthened by changes made two months later when 'Umar Nadhmi entered the Cabinet as Deputy Premier, Fadhil Jamali came from Cairo to Foreign Affairs on the appointment of 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh to direct the National Bank, and Tawfiq al-Na'ib, a former judge and Mutaṣarrif and a supporter of Ṣaliḥ Jabr, became Minister of the Interior. The Prime Minister hoped at midsummer to secure further strength in support of a Ministry which its own dissensions were destroying. He consulted Jamil al-Madfa'i, Ṣaliḥ Jabr, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and 'Ali Mumtaz, of whom the last two were expected to join him; but agreement on the appointments was not forthcoming and the Cabinet barely survived into the winter of 1949–50. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior, not being deputies, were forced under the Constitution to resign office after six months, and their places were taken in September by Shakir and 'Umar Nadhmi.

Taking advantage of the partial lull in party activity while only the Independence Party was in full operation, Nuri Pasha decided late in the year to found his own party, that of Constitutional Union. With an unexceptional programme of Arab brotherhood, friendship to all nations, anti-Communism, Treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at home and abroad, the party was composed of various elements of conservatism and vested interest, tribal and urban, and found cohesion in a common devotion to Nuri himself—as long as he remained powerful; and, taking its place as by far the largest and most amenable of the parties, it could not but dominate the Chamber as long as it held together. It was joined by an imposing array of ex-ministers and *ministrables*.

The last act of the Pachachi Ministry had been to arrange yet another drive against the Communists, and the first of the Sa'idi Cabinet was to continue it. Some hundreds of arrests were made, and led to scores of severe sentences for sedition and treason. Four notorious Communists—Yusif Salman, Yahuda Ṣadiq, Zaki Baṣim, and Ḥusayn Muḥammad Shabibi (a Christian, a Jew, and two

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

668 661 Muslims) were condemned to death and, this time, executed amid the angry protests of the world's Communist press; another suffered the same fate in May. The Central Committee and records of the Communist Party were, it was claimed, located and disrupted, and the Government were satisfied that the back of the movement was at last broken. Lesser offenders against the State—or, as the malicious murmured, against the Prime Minister—received varying sentences. Kamil al-Chadirchi was sent to prison for four months. Demonstrations on the anniversary of the Portsmouth Treaty were strictly controlled, but led nevertheless to some rioting and many arrests. The procedures of martial law worked with less friction during the year, but Nuri felt still unable, in such times, to restore a normal régime. In spite of alarming rumours in the spring the return of Mullā Muṣṭafā from Russia and his expected invasion of 'Iraq were still delayed.

648 Relations with Great Britain, which in 1948 had deteriorated more over Palestine than over the Treaty issue, and most of all over the British refusal to provide arms, improved in 1949 with a less Anglophobe Ministry and with the resumption of the supply of modern weapons to the Army as soon as it had left Palestine. Visits to London were paid by the Regent, the Prime Minister, and ministers during the year, loans were gladly received and British experts recruited; but it remained inconceivable that any younger politician, or indeed any party except the Prime Minister's, should not, by conviction or mere habit or 'patriotic' duty, blame Great Britain for all the evils of the State.

652 If a substantial reassertion of Government authority was one of the Pasha's achievements in his tenth premiership, he was able also to prevent further financial deterioration. The rate of annual deficit was checked, borrowing for current needs was avoided, and after a precarious year the latter months of 1949 showed less anxious prospects. A budget for 1949–50, balancing at ID 25 million of revenue and expenditure, was produced without excessive delay and provided for enhanced Customs revenues and for some economies in administration. Proposals made for higher taxation or for greater retrenchment were, for political reasons, not pursued, and the trade and economic position, in spite of a good 1949 harvest which permitted the resumption of grain exports, remained unfavourable; but military expenditure on account of Palestine ended in July, and help was forthcoming from the sale of Government stores and from oil royalties received in advance. The promise of loans from London and from the International Bank for development purposes was obtained by negotiations in Europe in the summer of 1949, and an advance of £3 million from the 'Iraq Petroleum Company was offered conditionally upon the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

American 'military aid' assistance, and was visited by the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The Mutaṣarrifs, after a slow start, began before the end of 1950 seriously to use the powers which were theirs under the Liwā Administration Law, and provincial administration, it could be hoped, would show henceforth a picture of livelier initiative as greater funds became available. Manifestations of local Communism were less evident, and when they appeared were suppressed by police action; but its vitality was still clear in the tone of press articles, in the streets and meetings in Sulaymaniya, and in busy if temporarily invisible cells among the Port, railway, and oil company workers. Its most formidable strength lay among these and among the bitter and dissatisfied young politicians who despaired of social reform for the people, or advancement for themselves, unless by revolution: who distrusted and indeed detested the Western Powers for their Palestine policies and their seeming support of conservatism: and who advocated a policy of strict international neutrality, if not of positive adhesion to the Russian bloc—a policy strong in its appeal to considerable elements other than Communist. When the Korean war forced the Arab States to define their position between the two world groups, 'Iraq followed the majority of the League members in approving the Western Powers' resistance, but unlike Turkey offered no practical help; if Northern Korean invaders were to be withstood, why had not Zionist?

If the question of the international attitude to be adopted was a main cause of division in Baghdad, there were others. The dilemma of the 'Iraqi Jews, many of whom had braved the law by escaping from the country in 1948 and 1949 and more had followed when martial law ceased, was met by a law of March 1950. Strongly attacked in the Senate, it permitted these departures with forfeiture of 'Iraqi nationality and with the right for each emigrant to take a mere 50 dinars from the country. By the end of 1950, 90,000 Jews had registered their names to leave the territory, and 20,000 had already left. The transport supplied was that of an American air transport company, who enjoyed a monopoly by arrangement with the Jewish Agency. The attitude of Government, once it had established this policy, was to urge more and faster departures, and popular voices were heard (but not officially countenanced) advocating concentration camps or expulsion for such Jews as remained. Indeed, with the loss of their position in officialdom—even where, as in Telegraphs and Railways, they were with great difficulty replaced by imported Pakistanis—and of equal rights and opportunities in commerce, even the remnant of the ancient community could look to no hopeful future in 'Iraq. Nevertheless some thousands elected to remain, including many of the most

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/For an account of Arab Nationalism prior to 1914, and of Nationalism in Iraq between 1914 and 1920, see category 116, pp. 222-265./

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'IRAQ

Arabs of Mesopotamia, notwithstanding the efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his associates to win Arab support in other directions[1] had far-reaching effects, not only during the period of hostilities but also long after the end of the war.

The British authorities in Mesopotamia lost thereby the wartime services of capable Arab leaders. Arabs of 'Iraq by the score, once in Turkish service, were gathered from the internment camps in India and Egypt, to serve as leaders and officers, not in the land of their birth, but in the Hijāz. In contact there with the sources of the Arab Movement, they were to imbibe and to pass on to 'Iraq, in the days after the Armistice, an intensity of Arab Nationalism hitherto unknown in 'Iraq. On the western side of Arabia, they had come into contact with English officers who, no less sincere in their allegiance to British interests than those on the eastern side of Arabia, were nevertheless sympathetic to this awakening Arab Nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that these 'Iraqīs felt the difference between the official mind in Mesopotamia and that on the Mediterranean side of the desert, nor that, appreciating the difference, they were all the more impatient with the attitude of the Civil Administration which prevailed at Baghdad after Sir Percy Cox had been sent to Teheran in early 1918. Such impatience was none the less because they had little or no experience or knowledge of the difficulties of the military or administrative problems of Turkish Arabia, of which the British had gained an intimate, first-hand knowledge.

The military authorities in Mesopotamia also lost the opportunity to learn what British officers in western Arabia had already learned: that the Arabs might be more than treacherous, self-seeking, half-civilized peoples. The end of the war,

[1] To the untimely death of Capt. W. H. I. Shakespear near Artawī, in January, 1915, has been ascribed the failure of Ibn Sa'ūd to take an active part in the war and the failure to develop in Mesopotamia an Arab Movement comparable to that in the Hijāz. See Philby, *The Heart of Arabia*, Vol. 1, p. 21; Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia, 1914-1917*, p. 161; also, Coke, Richard, *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 221.

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Lord Curzon, on the receipt of the telegram, which did not officially reach the Foreign Office until June 24th,[1] took the position that the creation of the sanctioned provinces, councils and advisory positions were steps in devolution and in decentralization from the temporary military administration. He could not understand, moreover, why the application of such steps should be dependent on the inclusion of Mōsul in 'Iraq or on any particular combination of provinces. The original sanction for the Acting Civil Commissioner's proposals had not implied that any combination of provinces or that even the guardianship of H.M. Government would be permanent. A telegram to this effect was dispatched to Baghdad, July 5th, which stated in conclusion: 'Any action which would give rise in Mosul Wilayet or elsewhere to the impression that the future political status of 'Iraq has already been decided upon should therefore be most scrupulously avoided.'[2]

Still unsatisfied, the Acting Civil Commissioner, instead of devoting his energies whole-heartedly to the execution of the proposals which he had himself drawn up, entered into further correspondence with H.M. Government, endeavouring to obtain their approval to the inclusion of Mōsul in the new regime.

Growth of 'Iraqī opposition

In the meantime, opposition to British control had continued to grow both in 'Iraq and in Syria. A letter in January, 1919, from the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, welcoming the Anglo-French Declaration as an indication that no part of 'Iraq was to be under foreign rule, had been followed in early June by another letter, supposed to have been written by Amīr Faisal himself, and addressed to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The letter suggested that the severity of the British officials in 'Iraq had begun to turn

[1] Young, op. cit., pp. 287-8.
[2] Telegram S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 5th, 1919.

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away the regard of the people, and that if the Anglo-French Declaration signified anything, the time had come for a change. His own officers felt strongly the need for the acceleration of a National Government and fully understood that the longer the present system existed the greater would be the difficulty in changing the system later.

Lord Curzon, however, believed that no further action was necessary. He had already, two months before, sanctioned what he believed was the limit of Arab self-government compatible with a military occupation. No reply was sent.

The incident of Nājī Beg as-Sūwaidī, in addition, confirmed both the Arabs and the British officials of the hostility and bad faith of those on the opposite side. The Acting Civil Commissioner, on his journey from London to Baghdad, had interviewed two of the 'Iraqī officers in Damascus. He had admitted that affairs in 'Iraq were not perfect, and that he was ready to do what he could to meet their views. He had pointed out his difficulty in obtaining good men for positions in 'Iraq. He had at once agreed when the two officers had asked whether he would consent to a representative being chosen from among their number to go to Baghdad and to make suggestions.

Accordingly, Nājī Beg, a capable and ardent Nationalist, of an old Baghdad family,[1] arrived in Baghdad, early in June. He soon found, contrary to the expectations which the interview with the Acting Civil Commissioner had aroused in himself and in his fellow 'Iraqīs, that he was to be merely a cog in the British machine and that his advice would not be heeded and was not even wanted.[2]

[1] Nājī Beg, now known as Nājī Pasha, was a son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī who, as a prominent Arab Nationalist in Baghdad before the war, had suffered imprisonment at the hands of the Turks (*Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1913), and who took a large part in the post-war Nationalist movement in 'Iraq. Nājī Pasha had been a popular *Qaimmaqām* of Najaf under the Turks (ibid., April, 1913). He was Acting Civil Governor of Aleppo under the Damascus Government, and has been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, etc., of 'Iraq.

[2] In an interview with the writer, Nājī Pasha stated that he believed that he had been asked to come to Baghdad to assist and to advise in setting up a National Government. On discovering his mistake, he resigned.

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COMMITMENTS, ETC.

His subsequent resignation and return to Syria confirmed the opinion of the 'Iraqīs in Syria that the British authorities in 'Iraq regarded them as active enemies who were trying to undermine British influence in the country, and that no real opportunities would ever be given to the 'Iraqīs to manage their own affairs. The Acting Civil Commissioner, in his turn, was convinced that his view of the Arab Nationalists was the correct one: that they were incapable and inconstant and that nothing constructive might be expected from them. When, therefore, the Acting Civil Commissioner's opinion was asked on a draft reply[1] to a Memorandum which the 'Iraqī officers had sent to the Foreign Office demanding the immediate establishment of a National Government, he gave way to a characteristic outburst, deprecating in no uncertain language that an important announcement should be drawn from H.M. Government by 'such small fry'. He suggested, however, that if a reply were believed to be necessary it 'should be restricted to an intimation that the writers appear to have been misinformed as to the progress of events in Mesopotamia, and that it is open to them to go to Mesopotamia to see things for themselves'.[2]

Some form of reassurance to the 'Iraqī officers was held to be necessary by both Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu. A new reply was drafted. After stating that 'pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to Mandatory power and nature of Mandate it would be premature to attempt constitutional experiments', it followed the Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion for a reply and pointed out that if the officers would visit the country they would find that Provincial and Divisional Councils were already being formed 'to ensure measure of Arab participation compatible with military occupation and mutual interest in political future'. The appointment of Nājī

[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 15th, 1919.
[2] Telegram No. 8107, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, July 19th, 1919.

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Pasha was mentioned as evidence of the goodwill of H.M. Government.[1]

Whatever the effect of the reply at the time on the Acting Civil Commissioner to whom it had been repeated for his information, he was later to claim that it came as 'a serious blow, not less serious because it was addressed to Cairo, for communication to a group of prominent 'Iraqī Officers in the Sharifian service, and was the outcome of telegraphic correspondence extending over four months'.[2] The evidence available makes it difficult to understand how he could have regarded the reply, drafted by H.M. Government on the lines he had himself put forward on July 19th, as the unexpected and disastrous result of his own efforts extending over four months of telegraphic correspondence.[3] His correspondence during that period had been concerned principally with persuading H.M. Government to limit Arab participation in the administration and not to extend it, and with urging the inclusion of Mōsul in a British-administered 'Iraq. Nor is it easy to understand just how the reply which he had assisted in drafting was a blow or check to the carrying out of the proposals with the execution of which he had been entrusted in May. The excerpt which he later extracted from the telegram and presented in a setting of his own fashioning in his *Clash of Loyalties*[4] might well give such an impression if it were not known that he had already been informed in the telegram of July 5th that constitutional experiments, other than those already sanctioned, could not be approved. The telegram of August 9th, taken as a whole and in its proper setting, can be considered only as a blow to the demand of the 'Iraqī officers for immediate National Government. Far from being a rebuff to him, the telegram

[1] Telegram, No. 249, Foreign Office to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Cairo, August 9th, 1919, repeated to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.
[2] Wilson, op. cit., p. 124.
[3] Ibid.: 'I eventually elicited the following pronouncement from the Foreign Office (9th August) . . .'
[4] Ibid.

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indicated that the British Government stood behind him in his attempts to realize the measures he had proposed in April and should have been extremely welcome to him in his attempts to combat any scheme of Arab Government as implied in the Anglo-French Declaration. Indeed, so far was the Acting Civil Commissioner from being actually affected by the 'serious blow', as he has endeavoured to indicate, he was assuring H.M. Government within the following week that, while the constitutional proposals sanctioned in May would require a year to put into operation, they would meet the needs of the country for many years to come.[1]

In Syria, the agitation for a National Government at Baghdad continued, eventually overflowing into 'Iraq itself and swelling the local movement there until it broke into a flood of rebellion. The telegram of August 9th from the Foreign Office had not satisfied the 'Iraqī members of Faisal's staff. Nājī Pasha's appointment had been no answer to their aspirations; his resignation had been the confirmation of their fears. What they wanted, they declared, was assurance that the existing military administration was not to continue. They found

> the attitude of the British officials was more than that of administrators of a foreign population who were incapable, and would always remain incapable, of governing themselves than that to which the Baghdadi officers had become accustomed on the other side, of friendly advisers who started on the assumption that the Arabs were managing their own affairs, and that it was not for them to do more than make friendly suggestions for the improvement of their plans.[2]

The delay in setting up the various measures which had been sanctioned seemed to the inhabitants of 'Iraq no less than to the 'Iraqī officers in Syria to point to a lack of goodwill on the part of the Acting Civil Commissioner and to give substance

[1] Young, op. cit., p. 294.
[2] Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd to Major Sir H. W. Young, cited ibid., p. 297. Confirmed by Nūrī Pasha to the writer, December 18th, 1934.

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to the belief that no real aid to the achievement of their aspirations could be expected from that quarter.[1] Rumours were about that the mandate system was but annexation in a new form, and that colonization by the British and by the Government of India had not been abandoned. The coming of 550 English women, wives and relatives of officials, pointed to the establishment of the British for a long stay. The establishment of farms for experimental work in cotton-growing was interpreted as further evidence of India's intentions towards 'Iraq. Confidence was difficult to maintain in the face of so many facts and rumours. The 'Iraqīs, like their fellow Arabs, lacked patience to await developments. They desired results, and these immediately and in a tangible form. Cool and far-sighted heads were not lacking, but they were not always in control. The majority believed, as Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī was to remark later to Miss Gertrude Bell: 'My lady, complete independence is never given, it is always taken.'[2]

The establishment of the Syrian State, immediately following the Armistice, encouraged the 'Iraqīs to look to their own country where direct British administration continued.[3] The growing insistence of the Syrians that posts in the Damascus Government be given to Syrians only made it necessary for the 'Iraqī officers there to seek new outlets and opportunities for their energies. 'Iraqī officers, disguised as Beduins, had already toured Mesopotamia during July. They had reported that the temper of the country was rising, and that active agitation and continuous propaganda, backed with funds, might win independence from Great Britain if it were not freely given.

Other propagandists began to slip over the desert. Societies

[1] The attitude of the 'Iraqī Officers in Syria was ably reviewed by Gertrude Bell in her confidential note, *Syria in October*, 1919, pp. 3-4 *passim*.

[2] Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 569. Lawrence had continually drilled the same principle into the leaders of the Movement in Western Arabia: 'I had preached to Faisal, from our first meeting, that freedom was taken not given.' Lawrence, op. cit., p. 274.

[3] *Syria in October*, 1919, p. 11.

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already existing throughout 'Iraq became the channels of Nationalist agitation. Anti-Government and anti-British sentiment and discontent in the towns, in the religious centres, among the tribes and among the unemployed ex-officials, were stimulated and then skilfully assimilated to the nucleus of Nationalist feeling already existing among those who believed in Arab and in 'Iraqī independence as desirable in themselves. Appeals to religious fervour and fanaticism, to pride of race, to Nationalist feeling, to cupidity, and to all the elemental instincts in each of the component groups which had been drawn into the movement, were working their spell during the days when politicians of the West, like Joshua of old, bade the East stand still until the battle at Paris over the spoils should be ended.

H.M. Government was not entirely unaware that public opinion in 'Iraq during the last months of 1919 was not the same as had prevailed in the final months of 1918. As early as August 23rd, when a police report of July 7th stated that

> every Moslem Arab of education in Baghdad was a member of a society, with branches in all the important towns in Mesopotamia, which was described as simply a pan-Arab and anti-foreign organization formed with a view to the expulsion of the British and the establishment of Arab rule.[1]

Mr. Montagu's suggestion that an announcement should be made that Great Britain would remain in the country, in some form or other, was negatived by the British delegation at Paris which deprecated such action as injudicious in view of the state of affairs at the Peace Conference.

In October and November, when even more disturbing news was received of the temper of the country, of the attitude of the 'Iraqī officers in Syria[2] and of the slowness with which the constitutional proposals were being executed,[3] Lord Curzon,

[1] Cited Young, op. cit., p. 294.

[2] *Syria in October*, 1919.

[3] After six months, only four of the nine Divisional Councils and none of the Provincial Councils had been formed. On further inquiry, it was discovered that the Acting Civil Commissioner did not contemplate moving in the matter that year. Young, op. cit., p. 298.

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in alarm, called a meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee, November 10th. The Committee agreed that the first condition for recovery of confidence and for the future settlement of the country was the return of Sir Percy Cox. This would be difficult, however, until the Mandate was announced and he could act with complete authority.[1] The Mandate would probably not be given before the New Year, but an early announcement of his impending return was desirable. It was hardly possible that he could take up his new duties until the autumn.

In his turn, the Acting Civil Commissioner also realized that the temper of the country was altering. He assigned, correctly, much of the change to trans-desert sources but, considering the authors to be unimportant, he was inclined to underrate the necessity to take their views — a mistake which was to have serious consequences. Resentful of the Western Arabia policy, he was ready to believe that Sharif Husain's inordinate ambition, that England's golden sovereigns and the Arabs' love of plunder were the sole motives behind the movement in the West. He shut his eyes to the other factors. His contacts with the Middle East had hitherto been primarily in India, Persia and the Persian Gulf.[2] His first-hand acquaintance with Arabs and his knowledge of their character had been limited to the lower Tigris. He had no personal knowledge of the deep hold which Independence and Nationalism, as abstract ideas, had upon the 'Iraqī participants in the Arab Movement. He could not realize, therefore, that the motives which had helped to sustain them during months of desert warfare would continue to do so, even if their enemies were France or Britain.

He did not seem to realize that, however much the dignitaries of Baghdad might repudiate the officers as men of

[1] Reference to Sir Percy Cox in Tehrān, found him unprepared to return without complete authority.

[2] He had spent about ten days in Baghdad, July, 1911: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1911.

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importance and position,[1] many of the latter had been the life of the pre-war Arab Movement and had been instigators of several disturbances in the Turkish army.[2] Moreover, they had created positions for themselves by their ability, first in the Turkish Army and then in the Arab Movement and, in consequence, had acquired a reputation in popular opinion equalling their actual importance. In addition, the 'Iraqīs had in Mōsul, Basra, Baghdad and outlying districts, families, relatives and friends who cast up, at their instigation, waves of increasing size in the sea of 'Iraqī Nationalism.

Outwardly paying lip-service to Arab participation, his real opinion, not only of Arabs but also of those who advocated their wide participation in the government and administration of 'Iraq, came out in his memorandum on Miss Bell's note on Syria.[3] He disagreed with her fundamental assumption that 'an Arab State in Mesopotamia . . . within a short period of years is a possibility, and that the recognition or creation of a logical scheme of government on these lines, in supersession of those on which we are now working in Mesopotamia, would be practical and popular'. He declared:

> My observations in this country and elsewhere have forced me to the conviction that this assumption is erroneous, and although I am aware that in holding this view I differ from authorities and observers both at home and abroad . . . I venture, probably for the last time in my present capacity, to lay before H.M.'s Government the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. . . .
>
> I therefore regard the creation of an Arab Government

[1] Practically every 'Iraqī who served under Faisal has occupied, upon his return to 'Iraq, positions of responsibility in the 'Iraq Government. Their enemies declare that this monopolization of high office has been due to British influence, and to the fact that they have constituted themselves a ruling clique. Their friends maintain their position has been due to their ability and experience.

[2] As in Baghdad, from March to July, 1913: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March, April and July, 1913.

[3] Letter No. 34436, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, November 15th, 1919.

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Meanwhile, no further action should be taken on announcement made. I hope to be able to send you fuller instructions shortly.[1]

The reply of the Interdepartmental Committee filled the Acting Civil Commissioner with apprehension. The reference to 'framing the mandate' seemed to presage new and disheartening delays at a time when action was imperative. The failure to approve of the Bonham-Carter Report left him little with which to combat the growing unrest in 'Iraq. His telegrams to H.M. Government were, however, not without results. At the second of the two meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee to re-examine the draft Mandate in the light of recent developments, Mr. Montagu's suggestion of the establishment of a provisional Government with Sir Percy Cox in charge, on the lines proposed by the Bonham-Carter Committee but with increased Arab participation, was approved. The Interdepartmental Committee agreed that Mr. Montagu should draft the telegram along these lines.

Events had now begun to move more swiftly towards an announcement of intentions of the British Government towards 'Iraq. They were not swift enough, however, to prevent open conflict between the inhabitants of 'Iraq and the forces of Great Britain.

Excitement had been running high in Baghdad following the announcement of the Mandate. Meetings organized by the Nationalists had been held in the mosques where orators in the name of independence, race and religion had urged their listeners to rise against the British. Clashes between Nationalists and the authorities had already taken place, and it had been necessary to patrol the streets with armoured cars. The group of fifteen Baghdad Nationalists, known locally as the *Mandubīn* or Delegates, had approached the Acting Civil Commissioner asking for an opportunity to lay their proposals before

[1] Telegram No. P. 3839, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad May 20th, 1920.

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him for transmission to H.M. Government. He had tried to avoid giving the interview. He did not wish to give any opportunity for a demonstration and he felt that he had nothing definite with which to counter their demands. He held, moreover, that the *Mandubin* were unrepresentative, referring to them in his dispatches as self-elected Delegates, although they had received the approval of a public meeting held in one of the principal mosques. Realizing, however, that they had a large popular following and that they could sway great masses of public opinion, he finally gave them an appointment for the morning of June 2nd, at the Turkish *Sarai* or Government headquarters. He took the precaution, however, of inviting by name about forty other dignitaries of all religions, supposed to be favourably disposed to the British regime. To cope with possible demonstrations or disorder among the expected crowds, special police arrangements were made, troops were held in readiness at the barracks and R.I.M.S. *Comet* with steam up and trained guns was stationed on the Tigris opposite the *Sarai*.

At the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner explained the desire of H.M. Government to give a National Government and the difficulties which had been encountered. He declared that they were then about to make an announcement along the lines proposed in the Bonham-Carter Report of which he gave an outline. He reminded his hearers that nothing was to be gained by hasty action, and that with the best will in the world an indigenous National Government could not be set up at once. He warned them that any attempts at disorder or violence would be met with force and that the military authorities would be called in if necessary.[1]

The Delegates professed themselves unsatisfied with the proposals and presented their own petition asking for the immediate formation of a National Arab Convention for 'Iraq,

[1] Text: Telegram No. 6583, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

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elected according to Turkish Electoral Law. The Convention would be empowered to draw up proposals for a National Government as promised in the Anglo-French Declaration. They also asked for freedom of the Press. With these demands a number of the invited notables, contrary to the Acting Civil Commissioner's expectations, associated themselves and declared that 'Iraqi independence was the concern of the entire Arab people.

The meeting itself, although feeling ran high, had been conducted with dignity. As those attending began to disperse, the immense crowd which filled the Court of the *Sarai* hissed and shouted abuse at the British officials. The *Mandubin* were cheered and several of the leaders were carried out on the shoulders of the crowd. No clashes occurred, however, between the crowds and the police.

In forwarding the petition and an account of the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner threw the entire blame for the 'movement reaching its present uncompromising form, backed as it is by skilfully fomented public excitement' on the failure of H.M. Government to allow him to make the announcement of the Bonham-Carter proposals before the beginning of Ramadhan as he had requested on May 8th.

He then declared:

> It is probable that in the present temper a proposal that the country should submit even for a limited period to a provisional Constitution as to which they had not been consulted would be met on the part of the Nationalists by a Declaration of Independence. Such proposals would be represented as contrary to the Anglo-French Declaration, the real meaning of which is little understood and widely misrepresented, and would harden public opinion against us, while if the present temper continues the proposed Legislative Assembly would on being summoned convert itself into a Constituent Assembly though not so authorized.[1]

[1] Telegram No. 6584, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920.

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of these difficulties arose early in December when the Council disagreed violently over the provisions for tribal representation. It had been originally proposed that thirty tribal representatives should be present in the Assembly: twenty shaikhs of the major tribes and ten members for the smaller tribes, grouped together in each of the new *Liwās*. The Council (with the exception of five members), owing to the traditional fear of townsmen and landowners for the tribes, opposed any special tribal representation, although Sir Percy Cox pointed out that it was essential that every section of the population should be represented in the Assembly which was to decide upon the future of 'Iraq. Not until Ja'far Pasha proposed an alternative scheme of two tribal representatives for each *Liwā* with the proviso that tribesmen might register and vote as all other 'Iraqīs if they so desired, was the question settled.

It would appear, however, that these and other obstacles to the drafting and application of the law, including Saiyid Talib Pasha's opposition to it,[1] were used by the British authorities as excuses to postpone the inauguration of the Assembly, notwithstanding the official *communiqué* of May 30th, 1921,[2] assuring the 'Iraqīs that the elections would soon be held. Evidence was not lacking that attempts would be made to force the Assembly, if convened, to declare for a local and unacceptable candidate such as Saiyid Talib Pasha and to force it to make anti-British declarations. It was known that the Nationalist leaders, including some of the *Mandubīn*, were again active and that the National School party had been revived. It was also reported that several tribes, as those of the 'Afaq district and the Shammar Dhafīr, were contemplating another revolt at Nationalist, Turkish and Bolshevist instigation. Letters had been intercepted in January from Muhammad Ridhā, outlining anti-British plans and giving instructions for

[1] *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 5.

[2] *Baghdad Times*, May 30th, 1921. See also correspondence between the High Commissioner and the Council of State in *Lisān al'Arab* and in *Al-'Iraq*, July 15th, 1921.

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their execution to the townsmen and to the tribes. Newspapers had become increasingly antagonistic in tone.[1] Violent anti-British posters had appeared on the walls of Baghdad.[2] It is not surprising, therefore, that the High Commissioner was convinced that any immediate attempt to convene the Assembly would not only be disastrous for British policy and for the installation of the Sharifian Amir on whom British official approval had already fallen,[3] but that it would also produce fresh unrest if not actual disturbances of the peace. His view met with corroboration at the Cairo Conference.[4]

Preliminary reorganization of the administration began officially on December 3rd, when by a proclamation of the High Commissioner all the rights, duties and powers formerly possessed by the Civil Commissioner, Judicial Secretary and Revenue Secretary were assigned to the High Commissioner, Minister of Justice and Minister of Interior respectively.[5] Several of the Ministers, however, had already entered upon their duties, Saiyid Talib Pasha beginning his work as Minister of Interior on November 15th. Conditions had been somewhat chaotic, and the fact that practically all the correspondence was in English proved a difficulty. Nevertheless a satisfactory *modus operandi* was slowly evolved.

The British administration officers had been informed of the changes and given instructions as to their part in the administration directly by the High Commissioner on November 30th. The circular stated in part:

> The officers and departments hitherto forming part of the British Civil Administration in 'Iraq will come directly under the orders of the Council of State, and the reorganization of

[1] *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed, February 10th, 1921, for publishing seditious articles. Its editor and those concerned were given sentences ranging from six to eighteen months and the paper was suspended for one year. *Baghdad Times*, May 9th, 1921.

[2] As on November 27th, 1920; January 17th; and February 2nd, 1921

[3] *Infra*, pp. 309-10. [4] *Infra*, pp. 314 ff.

[5] *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 2. Also National Government (Transference of Powers) Proclamation, July 6th, 1921, ibid., p. 7.

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arise which will lead to the High Commissioner seeking his authority to bring to the notice of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq any action on your part which he may regard as detrimental thereto.

The terms of service upon which you are engaged have been set forth in a contract which has been given to you by His Majesty the King of 'Iraq.[1]

Ratification of the Treaty by the Council of Ministers

By the time of Major Young's departure for England, in early 1922, the main lines of the Treaty had been settled. The King and his Prime Minister had been consulted, but the task had remained throughout in British hands. Not until after the Council meeting of February 19th, 1922, when the Naqīb announced that neither H.M. King Faisal nor he felt able to continue the negotiations alone, was the Treaty, which had already received the approval of the Colonial Office, placed before the Council of Ministers. During the eight months the Treaty was before it, the Council suggested numerous amendments, but their main objection was that made by the King and the Nationalists: the Treaty did not specifically abrogate the Mandate relationship.

The Naqīb, in particular, agreed with the King that the interests of 'Iraq and of Great Britain required a treaty but he joined him in pointing out that the attempt of Great Britain to pose as an ally to 'Iraq and as the mandatory Power to the League of Nations was irreconcilable, as well as unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq. He hesitated to put his name to a treaty which did not satisfy national ambitions and which would displease the Muslims of India with whom he was intimately in touch and whose good opinion he valued greatly.

The evident reluctance of the King and his Ministers to ratify the Treaty as it stood was not uninfluenced by the increasing intensity of anti-Mandate sentiment, skilfully fostered by the

[1] Cited *Progress of 'Iraq*, pp. 289-90.

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Nationalists, to whom the King was inclined to turn for support. The great gathering of Sunnī and Shī'a Nationalists from all parts of 'Iraq, at Karbalā, April 12th and 13th, 1922, summoned by Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, ostensibly to consider measures of defence against the Wahhābīs, whose raids in early March had thrown 'Iraq into a furore of nervous excitement,[1] had been hailed as a body greater than the prospective National Assembly since it had met at the wish of the nation without the influence of the Government.[2]

Although the formal sessions actually came to little, moderate petitions replacing the original extreme demands,[3] the private meetings were more productive. From them developed the organization of much of the later agitation. The vernacular newspapers, which had steadily maintained during the spring that 'Iraq would not accept the Treaty so long as it contained a shadow of the Mandate,[4] were also to increase their virulence after the meetings.

The Residency attempted to counter this propaganda by inserting articles in the local English papers. These articles, placing the mandatory system in its most favourable light,[5] insisting that the misunderstandings of the Nationalists arose from the use of the wrong Arabic word for Mandate[6] and urging as a diversion, that 'Iraqīs should support their new army as a quick means of achieving independence,[7] merely stirred the Arabic press to fresh denunciations. The papers retorted, in unison, that the word Mandate, however translated, meant the same thing: subjection and colonization.[8] *Al-'Iraq*

[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.
[2] *Al-Mufīd*, April 17th, 1922. The King was believed to be giving his support to the Conference. See his telegram of thanks to the Conference, April 13th, 1922; *Al-Dijla*, April 16th, 1922; also *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.
[3] *Baghdad Times*, April 7th, 1922; but cf. *Al-Mufīd*, same date.
[4] *Lisān al-'Arab*, February 24th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 1st and 9th, 1922; *Al-'Iraq*, March 3rd, 1922; *Al-Jazīra* (Mōsul), April 4th, 1922.
[5] *Baghdad Times*, May 26th; July 5th, 6th, 1922.
[6] Ibid., May 27th, 29th; June 10th, 20th, 1922.
[7] Ibid., July 12th, 1922.
[8] *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-Rāfidan*, June 5th, 1922; also *supra*, pp. 261-3.

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pointed to Syria as a typical example of what the Mandate de-
noted.[1] *Al-Mufīd* declared that the Mandate, 'even if veiled
under financial control, assistance to the army and 'Iraq repre-
sentatives abroad' must be abrogated.[2] 'Iraq must be created
independent before treaties could be made, since treaties were
only possible between independent nations.[3] In answer to the
statement that Great Britain could not, even if she wished,
divest herself of her obligations to the League, *Al-Istiqlāl*
replied:

> We cannot imagine that the League has power to force Great Britain to accept the yoke of the mandate. Everyone has the right to return any responsibility prejudicial to him and his friend. Suppose the League asked Great Britain to put her fleet at its disposal. Would Great Britain agree as she has agreed to the yoke of the mandate?[4]

Al-Mufīd declared:

> If weak nations are by terrorism and enticement to sign a document that means slavery and oppression, weak nations will find means to release themselves from responsibility.[5]

British officials themselves were not immune from newspaper criticisms; Major Yetts, Adviser for the Muntafiq *Liwā*, in particular being singled out for attack on account of his alleged pro-Mandate activities.[6]

Mr. Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons, May 23rd, 1921, to the effect that H.M. King Faisal and the 'Iraq Government had not refused to accept the Mandate,[7] added fresh fuel to the flames. At a gathering in Kādhimain, a programme of further meetings in the mosques, of monster petitions and of telegrams to the British Government and to all foreign governments was drawn up. A great gathering was planned for the evening of May 28th, in the Haidar Khāna

[1] *Al-'Iraq*, June 7th, 1922.
[2] *Al-Mufīd*, May 20th, 1922.
[3] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 24th, 1922.
[4] Ibid., June 23rd, 1922.
[5] *Al-Mufīd*, June 28th, 1922.
[6] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 18th; *Al-Mufīd*, June 19th; *Al-Rafidān*, June 21st, 1922.
[7] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLIII (1922), p. 995.

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mosque, a special edition of *Al-Istiqlāl* being published to urge the population to attend.[1] Prompt action by King Faisal prevented disturbances at the mosque, but a committee was appointed to approach the King with protests against Mr. Churchill's statement.[2] Telegrams of protest to foreign governments, to the value of Rs. 1,500 (£115), were prepared but were held up at the instance of the High Commissioner, whose action was later confirmed by King Faisal.[3]

In the provinces, anti-Mandate and pro-Mandate petitions were producing a heated atmosphere, while revenue payment in the Euphrates area ceased, on the assurance of the Nationalists that the British would soon leave 'Iraq. In 'Amāra and Kūt, the great landowners viewed these assurances with great dissatisfaction. Many shaikhs, resenting the scant consideration already shown them by the Arab Government, feared the time when British control should be completely removed. On the other hand, a large body of shaikhs, including Shaikh 'Abdul Wahīd of the Fatla,[4] and tribesmen, mainly Shi'is and therefore under the influence of the *'Ulamā*, sought the overthrow of the British-controlled regime.

Tension was not lessened by the fact that in administrative circles, as early as the end of 1921, a distinction had been made, as by the *Qaimmaqām* of Abū Sukhair, between those who had taken part in the Insurrection of 1920 and those who had been and still were pro-British. The former, particularly in Hilla *Liwā*, by the special orders of the *Mutasarrif*,[5] were given light revenue assessments, facilities for payment and prompt attention to their complaints. The latter were faced with

[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 28th, 1922. *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed July 7th, when the license of *Al-Tauhid* (founded Baghdad, June 24th, 1922) was withdrawn.

[2] Ibid., May 31st, 1922; *Al-Mufid*, June 1st, 1922.

[3] *Baghdad Times*, June 4th, 1922. When the telegrams were held up in Baghdad, the Nationalists chartered a motor to take them to Persia, but the King was persuaded to bring pressure to bear on those concerned, to abandon the scheme.

[4] Chief instigator of the tribal revolt against the 'Iraq Government in 1935.

[5] The Mutasarrif's campaign, which he carried even into Karbalā *Liwā*, was based on (*a*) Rejection of the Treaty; (*b*) Resignation of the Cabinet; (*c*) Removal of the British provincial Advisers.

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unprecedented estimates and with demands for immediate payment, while their petitions received scant consideration. In Baghdad, the division extended to the Council where heated discussions occurred, as at its meetings of June 12th and 22nd. Ja'far abū Timman, Minister of Commerce, led the attack on the Treaty, declaring that all the Holy Saiyids and the pillars of Islam were opposed to it. His resignation, on June 26th, was taken as evidence of his sacrificial patriotism,[1] but in British official circles it was maintained that, realizing his post was about to be abolished, he resigned in order to win popularity among the Nationalists.[2]

Although the Council of Ministers resolved, on June 25th, to ratify the Treaty with a proviso which the High Commissioner had repeatedly urged them to drop, that the Treaty must be approved by the Constituent Assembly,[3] it was clear even before the critical days of August, that political antagonisms had received sharp definition. It was apparent that they were likely to increase in bitterness with the prospect of settlement by force only. Both sides had burned their bridges behind them. The *'Ulamā*, opposed to the Mandate, had spent heavily on propaganda and were in debt for their taxes. If they were unsuccessful in removing British control, they would be financially ruined. The moral forces on the side of the Government were stronger than in 1920 but the actual forces for repressing disorders were far smaller than two years before. Moreover, the forces included the 'Iraq army, which under the circumstances was an extremely doubtful element.

An early publication of the Treaty, together with a clear statement of the alternatives between which 'Iraqīs would be forced to choose, would have cleared the air.[4] In the absence

[1] *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 27th, 1922; *Al-Tauhīd*, July 2nd, 1922.

[2] *Report on 'Iraq Administration, April, 1922—March, 1923*, Colonial No. 4 (1924), p. 14.

[3] Ja'far abū Timman signed the resolution, dissenting, however, with most of the articles.

[4] Mr. Churchill's threat in the House of Commons, July 11th (*Parl. Debates*, Vol. CLVI (1922), p. 1121), 'to wash our hands of the whole business', only aggravated public feeling in 'Iraq. *Al-Mufīd*, July 23rd, 1922.

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of a clear pronouncement of policy from H.M. Government, the demand for withdrawal from 'Iraq made by the British Press and by Parliament,[1] duly reported in 'Iraq, encouraged the Nationalists to believe that continued agitation would force the British to withdraw.

The difficulties facing the High Commissioner and the 'Iraqīs favouring the Treaty were not decreased by the attitude of H.M. King Faisal. He recognized the necessity for a treaty in accordance with the conditions of his enthronement, yet he continued to rely on the Nationalists for support in opposition to the terms of the Treaty as placed before him. Prominent Nationalists, such as Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī,[2] Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, and others had access to him. Within the palace, Fahmī al-Mudārris and Saiyid Mahdī al-Bāsīr had his private ear. Ja'far abū Timman had been his agent in reporting the Karbalā meetings.[3] Although differences of opinion had grown up between the King and the Naqīb, both of them had 'proclaimed to the listening Universe that they will never, so help them God, accept the Mandate'.[4] The undoubted opposition of the King, together with his telegram to the Karbalā Conference, his favourable reception to the Nationalists, on May 30th, and his relations with the leaders to whom presents of money were known to have been given, confirmed popular opinion that to oppose the Treaty was not to oppose the King.

As a result of his association with the Nationalists, it has since been maintained that the King had been won over to their side.[5] Such an assertion implies that he embraced Arab Nationalism

[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CLI (1922), pp. 1554 ff.; Vol. CLVI (1922), pp. 1085, 1092, 1098-102, 1107 ff.

[2] By early August, however, a breach between Shaikh Mahdī and the King seems to have been complete. The latter regarded the former as pro-Turk.

[3] This did not prevent him from holding a meeting at his house, August 2nd, when the dethronement of King Faisal was put forward.

[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 643; also *Al-Mufīd*, June 26th, 1922.

[5] *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IX. (1922), pp. 235-7; Hooper, C. A.: *L'Iraq et la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1928), p. 33.

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only at the instigation of the 'Iraqī Nationalists, overlooking the fact that he had, in effect, early dedicated his life to the Arab cause. It disregards his previous work for Arab independence at every conceivable opportunity; at Constantinople; in Syria after the outbreak of the war at the risk of his life; in the Arab revolt; in Damascus in the attempt to set up an Arab State; and at the Peace Conference in Paris. The rejection of Arab claims at Paris and his ejection from Syria had neither curbed nor broken his ardour, as his unpublished *Memoirs* amply confirm. He remained the Arab patriot with dreams of an Arab Federation stretching from the Taurus to the Indian Ocean.[1]

In 'Iraq he found himself the point of balance between his British mentors and his own subjects. To the former, he owed his throne, as well as support for it. To them, he owed the prospect of future development for the country, but on their own terms. To his fellow Arabs, from whom only could come the moral support and the sympathetic public opinion on which he hoped to build the 'Iraq nation, he owed loyalty to the Arab cause. Only by joining forces with the Nationalists, whose ideas rather than those of the British, more closely approximated his own, could he win from H.M. Government the concessions which would give 'Iraq real independence and would place more power in his hands to meet the responsibilities which had been thrust upon him by the Treaty.

If he turned to the extreme Nationalists and to the *'Ulamā*, therefore, it was because he sought to adjust the balance in favour of Arab Nationalism. If he descended to indirect methods of obtaining his ends, it was because he held that the end merited the means, and because his better judgment was at times swayed and warped by influences within his palace.

[1] In spite of official denials of his anti-French sentiment, Faisal never renounced his ambition of recapturing Syria for the Arab Federation, making 'Iraq his base of attack.

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INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY

So definitely had the King's alliance with the extreme Nationalists affected the situation, that a prediction was made in British official circles in the middle of August that, unless he turned to the moderates, it would be impossible to foresee the outcome of the next six weeks.

The Council of Ministers itself felt that the King, in allying himself with the Nationalists outside the Cabinet, and in apparently approving of their actions, which had included denunciations of the Council, had failed to give it his confidence. These misgivings the Council expressed in a resolution on August 9th, when it requested 'His Majesty to co-operate with this persevering Government in conducting affairs, in order to convince the people that the Government of His Majesty can rely on the confidence of His Majesty'. By stating in his reply that he saw no reason to alter his policy, the King indicated, contrary to the advice of the High Commissioner, that he personally wished the Cabinet to fall. The Ministers, therefore, resigned on August 14th.[1] Their fall was hailed as a blow to the pro-Treaty party, the extreme Nationalists openly declaring that Ja'far abū Timman, Hamdī Pāchahjī and Maulūd Pasha would replace the fallen Ministers, that Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr would be Prime Minister and that the Mandate would be abrogated. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr immediately issued a manifesto to the people, advising them, among other things, to persevere towards complete independence and to reject the British Mandate by all legal means.[2]

King Faisal himself added to the critical state of affairs by writing to the High Commissioner, on August 20th, and stating that, in view of the existing uncertainties of policy and lack of definition of responsibilities between himself and the High Commissioner on matters of internal administration, he felt compelled to inform the High Commissioner and through him the

[1] The Naqīb remained in office for a few days longer.

[2] Full text of Manifesto: *Al-Mufid*, August 19th, 1922; summary: *Baghdad Times*, August 23rd, 1922.

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Colonial Office that, in the event of a rising, which was confidentially to be expected, His Majesty disclaimed all responsibility. He begged the High Commissioner either to assume the conduct of administration or to give himself a free hand to direct affairs on such lines as he saw fit.

The High Commissioner immediately drafted a strong reply, pointing out the responsibility of the King in the situation. The letter was withheld, however, in order that it might not mar the approaching anniversary of King Faisal's accession.

The two Nationalist political parties, *Hizb al-Watani*,[1] (National Party), and *Hizb an-Nahdha*[2] (Renaissance Party), which, with the *Hizb al-Hurr*[3] (Independent Party), had been formed in early August to take part in the prospective elections,[4] thought the moment opportune to add their weight to the protests against the Mandate. At a joint meeting, on November 20th and 21st, under the presidency of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. the parties drew up an address which they presented to the King.[5] The address culminated in three demands:

1. Immediate termination of the present policy and of British influence.
2. Selection of a Cabinet, members of which were to be sincere patriots, possessing the confidence of the people.
3. Suspension of treaty negotiations until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, its members having been freely elected.[6]

Arrangements were also made by the parties for a joint public protest on August 23rd at the anniversary celebration.[7]

On the morning of the 23rd, when the High Commissioner

[1] Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 8th, 1922.
[2] *Al-'Iraq*, August 10th, 1922; Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 21st, 1922.
[3] *Baghdad Times*, August 11th, 1922.
[4] The Law of Associations, under which the parties were strictly regulated had been approved, after much delay, by the Council on June 29th, and promulgated on July 2nd, 1922. *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 56-8.
[5] *Al-Mufid*, August 22nd, 1922.
[6] *Al-Rafidan* and *Al-Mufid*, June 23rd, 1922.
[7] *Al-'Iraq* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922.

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and his staff arrived at the Palace, they found the courtyard packed and an address being delivered from a balcony. As the High Commissioner passed up the stairs, shouts from the crowd were heard, followed by loud applause. After the audience at which the King appeared to be somewhat nervous,[1] the High Commissioner, on inquiry, learned that the demonstration as arranged by the *Hizb al-Watanī* and *Hizb an-Nahdha* had been directed against the Mandate. The next day, he sent a strong protest, demanding an apology and the arrest of those responsible for the affair. The apology was immediate and ample.[2] Unfortunately the King, about noon on the same day, was stricken with appendicitis, an operation being performed early the following day. The necessary papers, however, had not been signed by him. The High Commissioner approached His Majesty shortly before the operation, but the King refused to sign, protesting that he would not put his signature to the condemnation of any of his subjects as an act which might well be his last.

The High Commissioner at once issued a proclamation, taking over the reins of government into his own hands and stating that the absence of a Cabinet, the King's illness and the seditious disturbances in the country left him no other alternative.[3] Hamdī Pāchahjī, Saiyid Mahdī al-Basīr, Amīn al-Chārchafī and 'Abdul Rasūl al-Kubba were deported to Henjam. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr and Shaikh Muhammad Māhdī al-Khālisī were advised by the High Commissioner that 'if they did not go, he would be forced to take measures which, out of respect to the *'Ulamā*, he did not want to take'. They crossed the Persian frontier, August 29th. Notice was served that any further attempts at sedition would be promptly and severely dealt with.[4]

From the provinces disquieting news had been reported. In

[1] Cf. Bell, op. cit., p. 649.
[2] *Baghdad Times*, August 26th, 1922. No Arabic papers printed these letters.
[3] Ibid., Special Edition, August 26th, 1922.
[4] Ibid.

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Shamīya, the chiefs were defiant; in Dīwānīya, tribal lawlessness had broken out, while in Nāsirīya and Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, public order trembled in the balance. In Diyālā, unrest had increased to such an extent that had any rising taken place elsewhere, the tribes of Dīltāwa, Shahrābān and Delli 'Abbās would unquestionably have risen. Prompt and strong measures restored administrative authority on non-party lines, however, the Nationalist officials being summoned to Baghdad where the outstanding offender, the *Mutassarif* of Hilla, was tried and adjudged to be unworthy of future employment. Revenue was collected, land cases settled and incipient revolt checked, aerial action being necessary in four cases to re-establish the authority of the Government.

Whether or not the actual incident on August 23rd required the stern and, in the case of the deportations, even harsh measures employed, there can be no question that the High Commissioner, as responsible for peace and order, considered his measures, vigorously and promptly taken, to be essential for the well-being of the country as well as for the eventual success of British policy. His actions restored prestige to the Government, the country as a whole settling down to 'an era of reconstruction'.[1]

In order that the measures taken by the High Commissioner should appear to be constitutional, it was essential that they should be ratified by the King. Both British and 'Iraqī officials were aware of the grave situation which might result if the King should refuse to give the required ratification. On September 10th, the High Commissioner approached King Faisal. His Majesty was told plainly that the British Government would not tolerate his connection with future Nationalist agitation nor any further delay in ratifying the Treaty. The King agreed to invite the Naqīb to form a new Cabinet, after the receipt of a declaration from the Secretary of State for the Colonies which would form the basis of an announcement of his

[1] *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, p. 21.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE WORK OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Convocation of the Constituent Assembly

No subject, other than the employment of foreigners in government posts and the general anti-Mandate propaganda occupied more attention in the Arabic Press from 1920 onwards than the demand for the convocation of the promised Constituent Assembly in order that it might express the wishes of the country concerning its future Government. When, however, the *'Irāda* ordering the elections to the Constituent Assembly to begin on October 24th was issued, October 19th, 1922,[1] after a delay of nearly two years, it met with a far different response than had been anticipated. The Nationalists and the Shī'a *'Ulamā* united in opposition to its application. The *'Ulamā* of Najaf and of Kādhimain, including Shaikh Madhī al-Khālisī who had been among the Nationalists calling most loudly for the Constituent Assembly, were induced to issue *fatwās* in early November, forbidding any participation in the election.[2]

The immediate effect of the *fatwās* was to bring the elections to a standstill in Shi'a centres. In Najaf, Karbalā, Hilla and Kūfa, the Electoral Committees resigned. In Kādhimain, the officials declared themselves unable to form Election committees.[3] In Dulaim *Liwā*, however, the *fatwās* had no effect,

[1] *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 82.

[2] The *fatwās* issued collectively by the *'Ulamā* of Najaf and Kādhimain, November 8th, were followed by others by individual *'Ulamā*. A translation of one of the latter is as follows:

'Yes, we have issued the order to prohibit the elections by the whole 'Iraqi nation.

'That whoever participates or gives assistance in them will disobey God and His Prophet. God has said in His glorious book that whoever disobeys God and His Prophet, fire shall be his lot. (*sd.*) Muhammad Mahdī al-Khālisī.'

[3] *Baghdad Times*, November 25th, 1922.

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but there, as in other tribal districts, little interest was taken in the elections until wider tribal representation was provided[1] at the insistence of the Residency which relied on its long-standing influence among the paramount Shaikhs to obtain their support in the Assembly. In addition, a large section of the public was reluctant to register, fearing that the election rolls would be used for conscription.[2]

Every effort was made to conciliate the *'Ulamā* but without success, the *fatwās* being reissued in June, 1923. It was maintained in British official circles that the only remedy lay in vigorous action against the leaders themselves. Only by their suppression would the opportunity be afforded of intimidating the rank and file to the extent that the elections could be continued without further active opposition. The Prime Minister favoured this policy, but King Faisal continued to hope for conciliation by other methods. When, however, collisions occurred on June 21st, between the police and the inhabitants of Kādhimain over the posting of *fatwās* at the door of the mosque and when demonstrations were subsequently organized against the Government in which Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī and his family took a prominent part, the Ministers, urged by their Advisers, felt it necessary to take strong action to vindicate the authority of the Government. Armed with an Ordinance, passed on June 9th, giving power to the Government to deport non-'Iraqīs for political offences, the Council ordered with the reluctant concurrence of H.M. the King, then visiting Basra,[3] the arrest and deportation of Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālisī, his sons Hasan and 'Alī, and his nephew, all Persian subjects. A demonstration of protest was immediately organized by the religious leaders of Najaf, a group of nine important *'Ulamā*, also Persian

[1] By means of a liberal interpretation of Article III (*a*) of the Election Regulations by the Ministers, in late August, 1923.

[2] *Al-'Iraq*, December 2nd, 4th, 1922.

[3] Official *Communiqué*, *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-'Iraq*, June 25th, 1923, *Al-'Āsima*, June 27th, 1923. The Arabic Press generally approved of the deportations: *Al-'Iraq*, June 27th, 30th; *Al-'Āsima*, June 27th; July 2nd, 4th; *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 25th, 1923.

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subjects, with twenty-five followers leaving for Persia as a gesture of their disapproval. The 'Iraq Government, although deprecating the action of these *'Ulamā*, gave them every facility to expedite their departure.[1]

The elections were renewed on July 12th.[2] Difficulties and delays, however, still remained, due to the refusal of the Shī'īs to form Electoral Committees, to the undiminished fear of conscription and to the resignation of the Sa'dun Cabinet and the formation of Ja'far Pasha's Ministry. The change of Ministries, although disturbing at this juncture, provided an opportunity for conciliating the Shī'īs, which the King had been anxious to facilitate.[3] In spite of these difficulties, the registration of primary voters was concluded on December 16th; the secondary elections were completed on February 25th; and the elected representatives were summoned to Baghdad and given a great banquet by the King on March 4th.[4]

Ratification of the Treaty

In the presence of the High Commissioner and his staff, the Air Officer Commanding and a large audience, the King, in an eloquent speech from the Throne, opened the Assembly, March 27th, eighty-four representatives being present.[5] He rendered thanks to God for the successful conduct of affairs of State and for the opportunity he now had of opening the *Majlis* which was to lay the foundations of the State. He then urged the

[1] *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, pp. 11-13.
[2] *Al-Istiqlāl*, July 13th, 1923.
[3] The new Cabinet was as follows: Prime Minister (without portfolio): Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī; Interior: 'Alī Jaudat Beg; Defence: Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'id; Finance: Hāji Muhsin Chālabi ash-Shalash; Communications and Works: Sabih Beg; Justice: Shaikh Ahmad Effendi Fakhrī; Auqāf: Shaikh Salih Bash'ayan; Education: Muhammad Hasan abū Mūhaisin. For its programme, see *Al-'Iraq*, December 3rd, 1923.
[4] *Al-'Iraq*, March 5th, 1924.
[5] *Majmū'a madhākurātu' l-majlisu't-t'asisī'l-'Irāqī* (Complete Proceedings of the 'Iraq Constituent Assembly, 2 vols., Baghdad, 1924), (hereafter Madhākurāt, Proceedings), 1st Session, p. 5; Bell, op. cit., p. 692; *Baghdad Times*, March 28th, 1924.

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PROGRESS OR RETROGRESSION?

Complete support, however, of the country has yet to be won by the new Government. It must count on the opposition of the exiled 'Iraqīs and of the adherents of the late Ja'far Pasha. It must count also on the potential opposition of all 'Iraqīs who for motives of self-interest have kept a foot in both camps.[1] Its real test will come, therefore, in its inability to carry out its promises and to meet other problems which face the country: placating the shaikhs at the same time that the land is divided, applying conscription to the tribal areas, bringing Shī'īs and Sunnīs into harmony and of meeting the rising cost of living.

The Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies, although a dignified body meeting regularly since its establishment in 1925 and conducting its deliberations as a rule with sobriety and moderation, has failed to take its full and rightful place in the political life of 'Iraq, as foreshadowed by the provisions of the Constitution. The failure seems directly due to its inability to command public confidence. The wave of scepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions which recently swept over 'Iraq, in common with other countries with a more substantial democratic tradition, prepared the way for the present military dictatorship. The slow progress of 'Iraq as compared with that of Turkey and Persia under dictatorial regimes was conveniently explained away as being due to the democratic institutions. The critics pointed out that the parliamentary system of 'Iraq was adopted from foreign models and was unsuited to conditions and needs of 'Iraq. They indicated and with more reason that the elections to the Chamber, without exception, have been rigidly controlled by the Government, often under pressure from the Residency as in 1928 and 1930.[2] In all districts except Baghdad

[1] See Macdonald, A. D., *Euphrates Exile* (1936), pp. 53 ff. for a discussion of this characteristic in 'Iraqīs.

[2] Principally because the Treaties of 1927 and of 1930 were to be ratified by the newly elected Chambers.

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forces might be stationed with immunity from local jurisdiction and taxation. The Treaty was badly received by the nationalists, but was ratified by the Assembly in November 1931. On 3 October 1932, on the strong recommendation of the British Government, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent state.

The nationalist leaders, who were soon afterwards called to govern, disappointed their followers' hopes of quick internal development and a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but retained some popularity by their ruthless treatment of the Assyrian question in the absence and against the wishes of the ailing King. His untimely death a few months later (in September 1933) was an irreparable loss. Even his outstanding talents had been tried in maintaining a balance on the one hand between nationalism and friendship with Great Britain and on the other between the antagonistic elements in the country itself, and his son Ghazi, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-one, though popular as a strong Arab nationalist, was inexperienced and inadequately advised. From the first, government was conducted haltingly by faction-ridden Cabinets which succeeded one another in rapid succession. By 1935 the factions were provoking tribal revolt, which yielded only to determined military intervention, in order to displace their rivals from power, and disappointed politicians were directing against the inefficient, reactionary, and increasingly authoritarian Government an alliance of reformist intellectuals who inclined to socialist or liberal democracy and of nationalist young army officers who favoured military dictatorship in imitation of Kemalist Turkey. This combination was brought to power in 1936 through a military coup d'état executed by General Bakr Sidqi in collusion with Hikmat Sulaiman, an admirer of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The movement ended within ten months as it had begun, in assassination and a military coup d'état. None of its pledges of reform had been fulfilled. Nationalists and reactionaries had neutralized and finally ousted the reformist elements, the army was divided, tribal chiefs alienated, popular liberties suppressed and a dangerous precedent set for military intervention in politics. In the following four years the army interfered time and again to secure the Government for rival politicians in the same factional politics of self-interest as had preceded the movement.

In foreign affairs the Government of this coup d'état had three treaties to its credit: a treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia, a boundary treaty with Persia, and the Saadabad Pact between Turkey (the inspiring force), Persia, Iraq, and

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the time of the Portsmouth Treaty, in which the remaining authorized parties also played an important part in opposition to the Government. After the withdrawal in 1947 of British forces, except those of the Royal Air Force stationed in the two Treaty bases, negotiations had been instituted for the revision of the Treaty itself and in January 1948 Salih Jabr, the Prime Minister, visited Great Britain and signed a new treaty at Portsmouth, by which the air bases were to be handed over to Iraq on the conclusion of peace treaties with the enemy Powers and thenceforth to be placed at the free disposal of British aircraft in transit, and an Anglo-Iraqi Joint Defence Board was to be established to co-ordinate defence matters. The Treaty was signed against a background of hostility towards the post-war Governments (and consequently against the Western Powers, who were supposed to provide their backing), aggravated by a grain crisis and the United Nations resolution to partition Palestine. Its announcement was greeted with student demonstrations; these were inadequately dealt with by the administration and, with the instigation of overt and probably clandestine political groups, developed into riots in which there were several casualties. Confronted with political opposition and mob violence, the Regent disowned the Treaty, after at first accepting it, and the Prime Minister with reluctance resigned. The Treaty was rejected by a new Government which, with its successors, restored outward calm. The Treaty of 1930 has since remained in force, although all political elements are pledged to revise or abrogate it.

The Palestine conflict evoked the strongest feelings in Iraq. Iraqi contingents fought there and were not withdrawn until 1949; and the closure of the Haifa oil pipeline has been maintained, at considerable financial loss. Similarly, at the time of the Lake Huleh incident in 1951, Iraqi anti-aircraft units were sent to Syria with considerable popular applause. In Iraq itself Zionist activity has been declared, like Communism, a criminal offence. There has been no overt retaliation against Iraqi Jews, but, in view of strong public feeling and governmental encouragement, some 130,000 from an approximate total of 150,000 quitted Iraq in 1951 and 1952, most of them for Israel, leaving an economic and financial vacuum which is only now being filled. The exodus was hastened by the discovery in 1951 of caches of arms and explosives on Jewish premises in Baghdad, together with documents which were stated to prove the existence of a Zionist organization for espionage and terrorism and its responsibility for several bomb outrages; a number of sentences were passed, two of death.

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Since the Palestine conflict the main features of Iraq's external relations have been: (1) the possibility of union between Iraq and Syria and, immediately after the assassination of King Abdullah, between Iraq and Jordan. The former possibility, apparently within measurable distance under the Hinawi regime in Syria, was blocked by the coup d'état of Adib Shishakli, and the latter by the stand of Tawfiq Abul-Huda and the disapproval of the Western and other Arab Powers. (2) An unpopular draft agreement with Egypt in 1950 binding both parties not to intervene in Syrian affairs for five years, and binding Iraq to consult Egypt in the case of an agreement with any third Power (this was considered derogatory to the honour and independence of Iraq and brought about the fall of the Cabinet); (3) Nuri Said's statesmanlike attempt in 1951 to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in co-operation with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; (4) consideration of the four-Power Middle East Defence scheme, towards which the attitude of successive Governments has varied, falling short equally of acceptance and rejection, while opposition elements have displayed varying degrees of hostility to it and considerable sympathy towards the formation of a neutral Arab bloc; and (5) the ratification in March 1952 of the Arab States' Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Pact. In some quarters the idea of a bloc has been extended to include Pakistan and sometimes India, being conceived as an Islamic or mid-Asiatic entity which should supplement and even supplant the Arab League.

Present Political Situation

Events in Palestine, Syria, Persia, and Egypt and the economic difficulties of a great part of the population have intensified the underlying ferment of the post-war period, which stern and continued action against Communism and incipient plans for national development have not so far availed to counteract. The rural majority, it is true, is still politically inert and merely lends its voting power to the landowners and tribal chiefs, but the spread of education is increasing the number of politically-conscious and under-privileged young townsmen who have provided, without much confidence in their efficiency or integrity, almost the sole support for the parties of extreme opposition. These parties have been constant in their denunciation of successive Governments as the tools of feudalism and imperialism, the more bitterly and irresponsibly for the realization that there is no foreseeable likelihood of their coming to power or even of influencing policy except at moments of crisis

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through the temporary support of the Baghdad mob. Even over the mob, once aroused, they have had no control, and demonstrations and rioting which they have played some part in provoking have been apt to benefit only the underground Communists. The real contestants for power since 1951 have been the parties based on the personalities of Nuri as-Said and Salih Jabr, both of them progressive in programme but supported by the same conservative commercial and landed interests, the party of Salih Jabr also by a certain Shii sentiment. In programme all five political parties[1] have been similar, though at any rate two of the three extreme parties have depended more on stated principle and less on personality than the others. Even in these the influence of personality has been greater than in British political parties, from which, too, they have differed in having as official members mostly professional politicians, with however a certain amount of public—mostly intellectual and student—support. The group of Nuri as-Said and its sympathizers have been in power during this period, the group of Salih Jabr maintaining an opposition which, mild at its inception, has, under the influence of personality and political developments, approximated increasingly to that of the more extreme parties, with which it has been in uneasy accord in opposing the new oil agreement of 1952 and demanding single-stage parliamentary elections for 1953.

Political tension and popular restlessness increased during the summer of 1952 under an irresolute caretaker Government which had been appointed in preparation for the elections, and in November a students' strike was converted by agitators into a demand for single-stage elections and resulted in rioting, arson, and loss of life. The army was called in to restore order and the non-political Chief of General Staff accepted the premiership with a mandate of pacification, which he was successful in implementing, though his well-meant attempts to improve the economic condition of the public were too superficial to be effective and disappointed the hopes which attended his popular appointment. Whether the return, in however restrained a form, of the army to politics will have re-established an old precedent is still to be seen. General Nur ad-Din's premiership was remote from military dictatorship, but it is inevitable that events in Syria and especially in Egypt should have turned some minds in that formerly unpopular direction.

[1] The five parties were: Constitutional Union Party of Nuri Said; Umma Socialist Party of Salih Jabr; Independence Party of Mohammed Mahdi Kubba; National Democratic Party of Kamil Chadirchi; United Popular Front of General Taha al-Hashimi.

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645 The General's Cabinet dissolved all the political parties in-
666 cluding the Constitutional Union, but conceded the opposition
665 demand for single-stage elections. Elections, carried out in January 1953, were boycotted by all but one of the former opposition parties, including that of Salih Jabr, on the charge of governmental control. The resulting chamber naturally showed an enormous majority for Nuri as-Said, though neither the boycott nor the existence of martial law can greatly have affected the issue: the extreme parties had anyway no prospect of success and it would appear that the party of Salih Jabr, in spite of its alleged expectations, was already outmanœuvred. The Cabinet which was subsequently formed under Jamil [185] Midfai remained in power till September; it apparently abandoned and indeed reversed its predecessor's cautious [722] attempt at economic reform. With martial law in force for little short of a year, political activity and polemic was for the time being stilled; but the suppression of a riot and the election of a conservative Parliament have not altered the fundamentals of the situation. A new Cabinet was formed on 16 September by Dr Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, former President of the Chamber of Deputies; martial law was ended by royal decree on 8 October and political parties were permitted to resume their activities.

668 But urban unrest, inflamed by the increasing participation of students in politics, can be expected to continue and spread, eventually to the rural population as well, so long as the public believes that the economics and administration of the country are subjected to the interest of a ruling class and its supposed allies among Western imperialist Powers who, in its opinion, maintain the State of Israel and are likely to involve Iraq on their own side in a third world war. Much of the bitterness with which this belief is held springs from privation or the fear of it. Once substantial results appear from the new programme of development, and the public is made aware of them, a foundation will have been laid for political stability.

Government and Constitution

643 The King of Iraq is King Faisal II, son of King Ghazi and
642 grandson of King Faisal ibn Hussain. The legislative power is
646 vested with the King in Parliament. Parliament consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Senators are appointed by the King from among those who 'by their acts have gained the confidence and trust of the people, and those who have an honourable past in the service of the Government and the country'. In number they may not exceed one-fourth of the

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Chapter VIII

FROM THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE TO THE IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY

THE ARMISTICE WITH TURKEY was signed at Mudros on October 30, 1918, and considerable portions of Turkey were subsequently occupied by the Allied forces. With the reluctant consent of France, the Allies permitted the Greeks to occupy Smyrna, and Greek forces marched into the city on May 15, 1919. One month later Mustafa Kemal Pasha began his nationalist movement in Anatolia. While the Allied powers were discussing peace terms with the Turkish Government in Constantinople, the Nationalists organized the Grand National Assembly, which met in Ankara (then called Angora) in April 1920, with Mustafa Kemal Pasha as president. But even as early as February of that year the Nationalists under Kemal operated with considerable success against the French who were in occupation in Cilicia.[1]

The policy which the French were pursuing in the Near East differed basically from that of the British. The latter were determined to reduce Turkey to complete impotency as a force in international affairs, but in order to assuage the millions of their Moslem subjects, they hoped to build up a new Islamic empire centered on the Sherifian family: Hussein in Mecca, his younger son Feisal in Damascus, and his older son Abdullah in Iraq. They therefore supported the Greeks against the Turks. The French, on the other hand, although they had reluctantly consented to the Sykes-Picot and other agreements on the Near East which aimed at establishing an Arab state or confederation of Arab states, resented the actions of the Arabs, especially the proclamation of Feisal as king of Syria, as interference in French schemes, and they looked on the Arab nationalist leaders as agents of the British. As soon as Clemenceau encountered

[1] "The Near East," *The Round Table*, XII, 319-337, Mar., 1922.